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Introduction
I.
With newly emerging issues in legal scholarship regarding the
effective protection of human rights, the role of human rights in
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investment treaty arbitration has become exceedingly important.'
However, beyond reflecting an academic interest, or even a certain
pro-human rights ideology, the question of this role is a pragmatic
international issue, which arose in the framework of a number of
well-known investment law arbitrations. 2 These proceedings
generally have involved investors alleging breach of an investment
treaty by the host state, arising from state action or policies
intended to protect or promote the human rights of the host states'
population.'
From an international law standpoint, such situations raise
I For a collection of papers on this question, see generally REMI BACHAND &
STEPHANIE ROUSSEAU,
INTERNATIONAL

INT'L CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIC DEV.,
INVESTMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS: POLITICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 1

(2003),
available
at
rd.ca/site/ PDF/publications/globalization/bachandRousseauEng.pdf,
DUPUY, ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN & FRANCESCO FRANCIONI,

http://www.ddPIERRE-MARIE
HUMAN RIGHTS IN

INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION (2009); LUKE ERIC PETERSON,
INT'L CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIC DEV., HUMAN RIGHTS AND BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES-MAPPING THE ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW WITHIN INVESTOR

STATE ARBITRATION 8 (2009); Marc Jacob, InternationalInvestments Agreements and
Human Rights, in I.N.E.F. RESEARCH PAPER SERIES: HUMAN RIGHTS, CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITIES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 6 (Mar. 2010), available at
http://www.humanrights-

business.org/files/international investment agreements_and human rights.pdf, Ursula
Kriebaum, Privatizing Human Rights: The Interface Between InternationalInvestment
Protection and Human Rights, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: LIBER
AMICORUM HANSPETER NEUHOLD 165-189 (Ursula Kreibaum & August Reinisch eds.,
2007); Laura Liberti, Investissements et droits de l'homme, in NEW ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT Law 791 (P. Kahn & T. Willde eds., 2007); Bruno Simma

& Theodore Kill, Harmonizing Investment Protection and InternationalHuman Rights:
First Steps Towards a Methodology, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW OF THE 21ST
CENTURY 678 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009).

2 See, e.g., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Arg., ICSID

Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability (July 30, 2010), available at
http://italaw.com/documents/SuezVivendiAWGDecisiononLiability.pdf
Aguas
del
Tunari S.A. v. Republic of Bol., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondents
Objections
to
Arbitration
(Oct.
21,
2005),
available
at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Frontserlet?requesttype=GenCase; Metalclad Corp.v.
Mex., ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1, Award, (Aug. 30, 2000), available at
http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Mexico/MetalcladFinalAward.pdf.
3 In these cases, the activities of investors appeared to threaten and even damage
the human rights of the population, especially in relation to the population's need for
sanitation and water. See, e.g., Suez v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19; Aguas
del Tunari v. Bol., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3; Metalclad Corp. v. Mex., ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/97/1.
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certain legal questions regarding: (1) the responsibility of the
investor for breach of human rights committed in the frame of
investment activities; (2) the responsibility of the home state for
demonstrating lack of diligence-i.e., failing to fight human rights
abuses by its own investors;' and (3) the responsibility of the host
state for breaching its obligations under investment and/or human
rights law.'
However, if one examines the same issue from the perspective
of contemporary investment law, most of these questions become
irrelevant. Indeed, it is common knowledge among investment
lawyers that investment treaties-bilateral (BIT) or multilateral
(MIT)-place no obligation on investors or on their respective
home states.6 In principle, investment treaties create obligations
only for the host state.' Furthermore, conventional references to
4 For instance, Francioni contends that the home state may be held responsible for
the activities of the investor for the pollution of the environment as well as the violation
of human rights. See Francesco Francioni, Exporting Environmental Hazard through
Multinational Enterprises: Can the State of Origin be Held Responsible?, in
INTERNATIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY

FOR

ENVIRONMENTAL

HARM

279-80

(Francesco

Francioni & Tullio Scovazzi eds., 1991) [hereinafter Francioni, Exporting]; see also
Francesco Francioni, Alternative Perspectives on InternationalResponsibilityfor Human
Rights Violations by Multinational Corporations, in ECONOMIC GLOBALISATION AND

HUMAN RIGHTS 245, 297 (Wolfgang Benedek, Koen De Feyter & Frabrizio Marella eds.,
2007) [hereinafter Francioni, Alternative]; Robert McCorquodale, Spreading Weeds
Beyond their Garden: Extraterritorial Responsibility of States for Violations of Human
Rights by Corporate Nationals, 100 AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 95, 96 (2006); Dinan

Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 273, 273-74 (2002); Vassilis P. Tzevelekos, In Search ofAlternative Solutions: Can
the State of Origin be Held Internationally Responsible for Investors, Human Rights
Abuses That Are Not Attributable to It, 35 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 155, 157 (2010).
5 See Francioni,Alternative, supra note 4, at 288-97 (analyzing situations where
investment-arbitration implicates human rights law).
6 See JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 194 (2009).
7 See Investment Treaty Arbitration: Protecting and Promoting Foreign
Investments,

ALLEN

&

OVERY,

L.L.P.

3

(2010),

available

at

http://www.allenovery.com/AOWeb/binaries/50590.pdf ("BITs create legal obligations
owed by the Host State to the foreign investor" and "allow foreign investors to enforce
these obligations directly against the host state."); see also Frances Aldson, Biwater v.
Tanzania: Do Corporations have Human Rights and Substantive Development
Obligations Stemming from Private Sector Involvement in Natural Resource Provision?,
18

ENv.

LIABILITY

58,

62

(2010),

available

at

http://soas.academia.edu/FrancesAldson/Papers/259939/Biwater-vTanzaniaDo-corpor
ationshave human rights and sustainable development obligationsstemmingfrom
privatesector involvement in natural resourcejprovision.
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human rights in such treaties are rather unusual.' Among the rare
investment treaties that do so, human rights are addressed in two
different ways. First, certain treaty clauses, such as Article
1114(1) of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
allow a host state under its respective regimes to enact measures
aimed at protecting human rights.' However, such measures are
only allowed to the extent that they are consistent with the terms
of the investment treaty.'o Second, other treaty clauses provide
that the provisions of the investment treaty do not limit the
regulatory power of states regarding the protection of human
rights. Article 10(1) of the Canadian BIT Model provides such an
Most
example; " however, this remains an exception. 1
investment conventions are silent on the issue of human rights.
Arbitrators are expected to deal with this gap following their usual
reasoning and means of interpretation within the limits of their
jurisdiction. 3
8 See e.g., Aldson, supra note 7, at 62 (setting out elements of a BIT as protection
against expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, etc.; however, human rights
obligations were not among them).
9 See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 111 4(1),
Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
10 See id Nothing in this Chapter [11] shall be construed to prevent a Party from
adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter
that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is
undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concern. Id. (emphasis added).
11 The Canadian Model BIT provides that:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner that
would constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between investments
or between investors, or a disguised restriction on international trade or
investment, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Party
from adopting or enforcing measures necessary: (a) to protect human, animal or
plant life or health.
Model Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, art. 10(1) (2004)
(Can.), availableat http://italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf.
12 Though shelved for the moment, the 2007 Norwegian Draft Model BIT provides
that a joint committee is set up for purposes, which among others "where relevant,
discuss issues related to corporate social responsibility, the preservation of the
environment, public health and safety, the goal of sustainable development,
anticorruption, employment and human rights." Model Agreement Between the
Kingdom of Norway and . . . for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, art.
23(3)(viii) (2007) (Nor.).
13 See generally SALACUSE, supra note 6 (discussing how neither BIT nor MIT
places a particular obligation on the states).
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In light of these characteristics, it is easy to understand that
arbitration tribunals lack the competence to rule on the
responsibility of the investor for human rights law violations. In
investment treaty arbitration, arbitral jurisdiction stems from
investment treaties' 4 and is, therefore, controlled by the content of
the treaties.'" Investment arbitration cannot rule over claims other
than those related to investment law.16 Nonetheless, the principle
that investment disputes (i.e., their legal basis, claims, and the
respective judicial competence) can only be "investment" in
substance does not mean that the law of international investment is
not "humanized" enough, nor that there is no place for its further
"humanization."l 7
This paper will attempt to demonstrate that traditionally,
investment law has always left room-whether silently or
indirectly-for states to dispose of the necessary margin to
effectively regulate various sectors of policy at the domestic level
in a way that is compatible with investment treaty obligations.
From this perspective, excluding human rights due to its
distinctive "lexicon," the law of international investments allows
host states to comply with human rights obligations and, more
generally, to develop human rights policies.'
It is important to note that the rights granted to investors by

Though beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting that jurisdiction can
also flow from an arbitration clause inserted in a contract between a host state and an
investor or from a unilateral offer provided in a domestic investment law. See generally
Emmanuel Gaillard, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Jurisdiction over Contract
Claims-The SGS Cases Considered, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND
ARBITRATION: LEADING CASES FROM THE ICSID, NAFTA, BILATERAL TREATIES AND
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 325 (Todd Weiler ed., 2005).
15 See Aldson, supra note 7, at 58 (explaining that the formation of the treaties
themselves often dictates the jurisdiction of any ensuing arbitration).
16 But see Susan D. Franck,
The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty
Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1523-24 (2005) (predicting that with the inclusion of public
international law rights, international arbitration will eventually absorb investment
arbitration).
17 On this concept, see M. T. Kamminga, Humanisation of InternationalLaw, in
14

CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
CEES FLINTERMAN

29 (1. Boerefijn & J. Goldschmidt eds., 2008) and THEODORE
(Martinus Nijhoff ed., 2006).

THE HUMANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
18

Id.

MERON,
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investment treaties are not absolute rights.19 If the home state's
class of investors are granted rights on a general policy level, the
same cannot be said in relation to individual investors in each
case. 20 At a casuistic jurisdictional level, investors are granted the
right to challenge a state measure aimed at protecting the public
and general interest, such as the protection or promotion of human
rights, which harms the individual investor's interest in such a way
that it entails a breach of the treaty. 2' The negative impact of a
state measure on an investor does not automatically entitle her to
treaty protection. 22 Rather, arbitration tribunals determine on a
case-by-case basis whether the investor is entitled to conventional
protection. 23 Naturally, in the normative frame of treaty
provisions, such endeavors require that the interests of the investor
be balanced against public and general interests. As illustrated by
the genesis of international investment law, both of these interests
are equal parts of the investment law regime. 24 Therefore, to some

19 General treatment standards under investment treaties include both absolute and
relative standards. See SALACUSE, supra note 6, at 206. Among the "absolute standards"
is full protection and security. Id. Even so, the ICSID tribunal in Ticnicas
Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States concluded that this guarantee
was not absolute. See Ryan Suda, The Effect of BilateralInvestment Treaties on Human
Rights Enforcement and Realization, in TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN

RIGHTS 104 (Oliver De Schutter ed., 2006); T6cnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v.
United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, (May 29, 2003),
available at http://italaw.com/documents/Tecnicas 011 .pdf.
20 See, e.g., Suda, supra note 19, at 104. ("[T]he guarantee of full protection and
security is not absolute and does not impose strict liability upon the State that grants it
[in cases where individual investors bring claims.]") (quoting Tdcnicas
Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003)).
21 See Kriebaum, supra note 1, at 177 ("[An] investor may use BIT provisions to
challenge human rights-inspired regulations that interfere with its investment.").
22 For example, in Tecmed the investor claimed additional protection under the
treaty, alleging that the Government of Mexico had breached its duty of "full protection
and security" by failing to prevent "adverse social demonstrations" at the investor's
hazardous waste treatment facility. T6cnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United
Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, 1 175 (May 29, 2003),
available at http://italaw.com/documents/Tecnicas_ 011 .pdf. The tribunal decided the
investor was not entitled to additional protection because there was "not sufficient
evidence supporting the allegation." Id.
23 See id.

24 See, e.g., Lars Markert, The Crucial Question of Future Investment Treaties, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND EU LAW 166 (Marc Bungenberg et al. eds.,

1114
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extent, the regime of international investment law is arguably
schizophrenic. It aims at protecting and promoting both the
interests of the investor as well as public and general interest. 25 In
cases of conflict between these two respective interests, a balance
must be struck.
Thereby, while balancing the interests of the investor against
general interests (that is, human rights), arbitrators not only
harmonizes two potentially conflicting regimes of international
law (investment law and human rights law), but, in substance, also
highlight the human dimension of investment law.
In this context, the aim of this article is neither to stigmatize an
incomplete system, which appears on its surface inconsiderate of
human rights, nor to sketch an ideal system regulating
international investment operations in such a way that would
impose international human right norms on investment arbitration.
Rather, the primary aim is to demonstrate that human rights
preoccupations have always been part of the investment regime
and that the "toolbox" of investment arbitrators traditionally
contains a number of tools that are specially designed to take into
account public and general interest. Hence, the object of this
paper is to investigate under which conditions a nondiscriminatory measure enacted by a host state-with the aim of
breach an
protecting or promoting human rights 26 -may
investment agreement. 27 By doing so, this article will demonstrate

2011).
25 See, e.g., PETERSON, supra note 1, at 34 (predicting that had the tribunal in
Tecmed v. Mexico found the government authorities acted unreasonably, it "would have
had to wrestle with the balance to be struck between the right to public protest and the
obligation to provide protection and security for foreign investment projects").
26 Considering this article focuses on the investment law system, the relevant
human rights norms are not considered in detail. For such a detailed presentation, see
REMI BACHAND, MARTIN GALLIE & STEPHANIE ROUSSEAU, Droits de l'investissement et
droits humains dans les Amdriques, in 49 ANNUAIRE FRANGAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL

575, 577-89 (2003). Furthermore, the reference to "human rights" is used in a broad
sense; it is intended to include the right of the first and second generations, as well as the
rights to development and environmental protection. See id.
27 The "measures" dealt with here cover measures addressing an investor in
particular, as well as measures having a general scope of application. When needed, a
distinction will be made between them. In addition, they refer to the state as a whole
and, therefore, concern the relevant practice of all the organs of the host state.
Considering its topic, this article focuses on investor-state arbitration and not on
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that such state measures rarely breach an investment treaty.
Investment treaty provisions that could be affected by
municipal practice over human rights are varied. 28 However, the
limited scope of the study renders it necessary to narrow the
analysis and focus only on two provisions which, in light of
relevant case law, are proven to be the most important-the fair
and equitable treatment clause (FET) and the prohibition of
indirect expropriation. 29 As explained in detail below, the keys to
balancing public and general interest against the interests of
investors-in relation to the FET and the indirect expropriation
prohibition-are, respectively, the principles of legitimate
expectations and distinct-investment-backed expectations.
Demonstrating that investment law is already "humanized"
does not, however, mean that there is no space for a more direct
"humanization." Hence, the second aim of this paper is to suggest
that in addition to the indirect effectiveness of human rights
protection by the public and general interest, general international
law also authorizes investment arbitrators to refer directly to
human rights norms.
Investment arbitration may resort to
international human rights law for two reasons: (1) to maximize
the legitimacy of a decision, striking the balance in favour of
public and general interest; or (2) to shift from what has previously
been described as a conflict of interests (between the investor and
the public and general interests) to a proper normative conflict
(between the rules of international law that establish human rights
obligations for the state and obligations vis-a-vis the investor).3 1
Starting with the second goal, Part II of this paper will focus

interstate arbitration, which is also mentioned in most investment treaties. Only the
former directly concerns the settlement of a dispute in relation with an investment
operation.
28

See

MONIQUE

SASSON,
SUBSTANTIVE LAW IN INVESTMENT TREATY
ARBITRATION: THE UNSETTLED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL

LAW 4 (2010).
29 For a discussion of the other provisions, see Suda, supra note 19, at 104.
30 Int'l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, NAFTA Arb. Trib.,
Dissent, [ 27 (Jan. 26, 2006) (identifying both legitimate expectations and investmentbacked expectations as the most important factors in balancing public interest against
investor interest).
31 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(3)(c), May 23, 1969, 115
U.N.T.S. 331, T 17.

1116
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on general international law by first briefly addressing the question
of its applicability in investment disputes, followed by a review of
the means available under international law to investment
arbitration, thus allowing tribunals to explicitly rely on
international human rights norms. Faithful to the premises set in
the introduction, this part will conclude by arguing that given the
nature and the consequent limitations, in the jurisdiction of
investment arbitration tribunals, there is a tendency to give a
limited role to international human rights norms.
Whether it is because investment arbitrators are not familiar
with human rights law or because they believe that sticking to their
competency in investment law will increase the legitimacy of their
arbitral decisions, international human rights norms to date are
generally absent from investment arbitration. 32 Nonetheless,
human rights are inevitably an important consideration in
investment arbitrations, whether or not the tribunals refer to them
by name. As it will be demonstrated, human rights considerations
are often disguised under the label of public and general interest.3 3
Part III starts by recalling the schizophrenic "ethos" of
international investment law, which aims to simultaneously
promote state development and to grant protection to investors.
The article then turns toward the tools provided, not by general
international law, but by the regime of investment law itself.
These tools correspond mainly to the two aforementioned guiding
principles of interpretation: legitimate expectations and distinctinvestment-backed expectations. 3 These principles function to
facilitate balancing public and general state interests and the
interests of the investor. After tracing back the administrative law
32 Investment treaties and free trade agreements offer few instructions as to how
such agreements should be reconciled with human rights; therefore, arbitrators have little
guidance in factoring those norms into their decisions. See PETERSON, supra note 1, at 8.
33 See, e.g., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Arg., ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability (July 30, 2010), available at
http://italaw.com/documents/SuezVivendiAWGDecisiononLiability.pdf (noting that the
case "may raise a variety of complex public and international law questions, including
human rights considerations").
34 Int'l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, NAFTA Arb. Trib.,
(Jan. 26, 2006) available at
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Mexico/Thunderbird/Thunderbird Dissent.pdf.
(explaining that both legitimate expectations and investment-backed expectations are the
most important factors in balancing public interest against investor interest).
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origins of the former principle and the shaping of the distinct-

investment-backed expectations principle by the U.S. Supreme
Court in the context of takings, this part of the article will detail
their respective functioning mechanisms and highlight their addedvalue in the context of international investment law.
This article will then focus on examining how, in practice,
these principles are given effect in the context of the FET clause
and the prohibition of indirect expropriation. In light of the tests
of legitimate expectations and distinct-investment-backed
expectations, this article will demonstrate that state measures
pursuing a human rights objective rarely infringe on the provisions
regarding the FET and indirect expropriation. The flexibility of
the FET and indirect expropriation provisions-and the idea that
the consequent rights they guarantee for the investor are not
absolute-allow for states to effectively comply with their human
rights obligations and develop human rights policies at the
domestic level for the benefit of local populations while still
complying with their investment law obligations.3 6 For a regime
which has been widely accused of being indifferent (if not
detrimental) to human rights, the tolerance and flexibility it
demonstrates in favour of human rights is a considerable one.
Is There A Role for Human Rights Norms in
Investment Treaty Arbitration?
The investment regime is open to accommodate rules
stemming from other systems, orders, or regimes." This applies in
the case of human rights law as well, which may be integrated into
investment arbitral case law both as part of the applicable law or
as a simple interpretative loan.38 Section (A) of Part II provides a
II.

35 One cannot overlook that these principles were originally elaborated within
specific domestic contexts and, therefore, cannot be imported as such within the
international investment law regime. Their applicability in the field of international
investment law thus depends upon a mutatis mutandis rationale.

36 See, e.g., PETERSON, supra note 1, at 34.

37 See id. at 22.
38 See id ("[A]s far back as the 1980s, an investment arbitration tribunal
acknowledged that obligations imposed by other international treaties [involving human
rights, for instance] ratified by a host state may be relevant in defending its treatment of a
given foreign investor.").

1118
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general framework concerning the question of applicable law.39 in
particular, it points out the interaction between the applicable law
and the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals.4 0 The latter tends to limit
the applicability of human rights. Section (B) focuses on human
rights law and discusses ways through which this law may be
introduced into judicial reasoning, and the potential it brings to the
investment treaty arbitration process.4 1 This section of the article
will focus on Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (hereinafter VCLT) and the so-called systemic
integration method of interpretation that this article introduces.42
The role of systemic integration is to allow judicial institutions to
introduce peripheral norms of international law that are relevant to
the norms that concern the case before them into their reasoning.4 3
Thus, harmony in international law may be attained.
However,. despite the potential of such a method of
interpretation, its helpfulness in the field of investment arbitration
remains limited. Without undermining the value of an explicit
reference to human rights norms for the legitimacy and profundity
of judicial reasoning, identical outcomes may be reached even if
an investment arbitration tribunal (as it most often does) chooses
to abstain from referring expressly to human rights norms.4 4 The
material philosophy of these rights may be accommodated
perfectly well within the concept of public and general interest.

39 See infra pp. 113-18.
40 See infra pp. 113-18.
41 See infra pp. 118-31.
42 "There shall be taken into account, together with the context . . . any relevant
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties." See Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 3 1, art. 31(3)(c). The International Law
Commission argues that "article [31(3)(c)] gives expression to the objective of systemic
integration according to which, whatever their subject matter, treaties are a creation of
the international legal system and their operation is predicated upon that fact." Rep. of
the Int'l Law Comm'n, Fragmentationof International Law: Difficulties Arisingfrom
the Diversificationand Expansion of InternationalLaw, 58th Sess., May 1-June 9, July
3-Aug. 11, 2006, if 17-23, U.N. Doc..A/CN.4/L.682 (Aug. 11, 2006) [hereinafter Int'l
Law Comm'n Report].
43 See Int'l Law Comm'n Report, supra note 42, at T 17-23.
44 See Azurix Corp. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, 254 (July 14,
2006), available at http://italaw.com/documents/AzurixAwardJuly2006.pdf ("Conflict
between a BIT and human rights treaties must be resolved in favor of human rights
because the consumers' public interest must prevail.") (emphasis added).
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This concept is inherent in investment law and authorizes a
balancing of the interests of investors in terms at least comparable
to the interests that would be applied if an arbitral tribunal chose,
by the means of systemic integration, to shift from a conflict of
interests into a conflict of norms.4 5
A. Human Rights Law as Partof the Applicable Law
Investment treaties are not closed citadels standing in a
vacuum. 46 To determine the responsibility of the host state,
arbitral tribunals are entitled to resort to a corpus of rules outside
the international investment law system.4 ' Nevertheless, it cannot
be forgotten that the aim of the investment dispute settlement
process is to assess the responsibility of states with respect to their
obligations under investment conventions, rather than on other
norms of international law, regardless of their importance to
society.4 8
This article shows that there is nothing prohibiting the
application of human rights law to the settlement of an investorstate dispute. First, it demonstrates that whatever law is chosen by
the parties, international law safeguards its applicability. Next,
this article explains that the significance of this applicability is
restricted by limitations in the jurisdiction of arbitration tribunals.
1. Applicability Safeguardedby InternationalLaw
Pursuant to the rules of procedure applicable to the settlement
of disputes, it is up to the parties to an investment treaty to select
the applicable law.49 If the parties have not specified which law is
45 See PETERSON supra note 1, at 22 ("[A] wide path is open for arbitrators to
consider human rights and other international law obligations of states in the course of
interpreting the obligations contained in investment protection treaties.").
46 See A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, State Contracts in Contemporary International
Law: Monist versus DualistControversies, 12 EUR. J.INT'L L. 309, 320 (2001).
47

See, e.g., id.

48 See Jacob, supra note 1, at 30 (noting that investment tribunals are generally
hesitant to deal with competing non-investment obligations and "prefer to disallow
human rights arguments . .. rather than engage with the substance of the matter").
49 A distinction is made in arbitration practice between "treaty claims" and
"contract claims." For the former, the applicable law is the law chosen by the states
party to the investment convention. When it comes to "contract claims," the applicable
law is the law determined by the host state together with the investor. See generally
Yuval Shany, Contract Claims vs. Treaty Claims: Mapping Conflicts between ICSID
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to be applied, it is determined by the applicable rules of
procedure. 5o The corpus of applicable law can include the
provisions of the investment agreement, the domestic law of the
host state party to the dispute and international law." Outside the
provisions of the investment agreement, domestic law and
international law can be applied either independently or together.52
Only a few choice-of-law clauses refer solely to international
law.53
For example, Article 26(6) of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)
provides that "a tribunal established under paragraph (4) shall
decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this Treaty and the

Decisions on Multisourced Investment Claims, 99 AM. J.INT'LL. 835 (2005) (discussing
differences between contract claims and treaty claims in international arbitration and
their potential for overlap).
50 See, e.g., Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States
and Nationals of other States, INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, art.
42, available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR Englishfinal.pdf [hereinafter ICSID Convention] ("The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in
accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. In the absence of
such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the
dispute (including its rule on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as
may be applicable"); U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade L. Arb. Rules, art. 33(1) (2010),
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arbrules-revised-2010-e.pdf ("The arbitral tribunal shall apply the law designated by the
parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute. Failing such designation by the
parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law which it determines to be appropriate.").
51 See Anthony Parra, Applicable Law in Investor-State Arbitration, in
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION 3 (Arthur
Rovine ed., 2008) ("The formula makes it clear that the parties may agree not only that
their tribunal will apply a domestic law or international law but also, among other
possibilities, combinations of domestic and international law rules.").
52 For a detailed analysis of the applicable law issue, see CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER,
THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 545-639 (2001). While addressing only
Article 42 of the ICSID Convention, the remarks made by the author are generally
relevant to this issue. For a detailed analysis of the interaction between national law and
international law in the context of Article 42 of the ICSID Convention, see Emmanuel
Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi, The Meaning of 'and' in Article 42(1), Second Sentence, of
the Washington Convention: The Role of InternationalLaw in the ICSID Choice of Law
Process, 18 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 375, 376 (2003) ("[I]nternational law may
apply either directly, possibly in conjunction with the law of the host State, or indirectly
as incorporated into the selected domestic law."). While addressing only the ICSID
convention, the interest of this article extends well beyond the ICSID regime. Id
53 See Antoine Goetz, et al. v. Republic of Burundi, 15 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV.
L.J. 457, 531 (2000) [hereinafter Antoine v. Burundi].
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applicable rules and principles of international law." 54
This type of choice-of-law provision begs the question of the
exact norms of international law applicable to the dispute.s" An
answer to this question can be found in the travaux prdparatoires
of Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention which refers to "such
rules of international law as may be agreed by the parties.""6
Pursuant to the report by the Executive Directors, "the term
'international law' as used in this context should be understood in
the sense given to it by Article 38(1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice." 5 7 In light of this statement, the
applicable rules of international law are those contained in treaties,
customary law, and general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations." As for their content, it is determined on a caseby-case basis.59 Hence, in this regard, and in the context of an
investment dispute involving state practice aiming to protect or

54 Energy Charter Treaty, art. 26(6), Dec. 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 360, 2080 U.N.T.S.
100; see also NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1130 ("A tribunal established under this
Subchapter shall decide the issues in accordance with this Agreement and applicable
rules of international law.").
55 As for the distinction between rules and principles, it can be noted that
arbitration practice does not give importance to this distinction, see SCHREUER, supra
note 52, at 952 (using the terms "rule" and "principle" interchangeably).
56 ICSID Convention, supra note 52, art. 42(1).
57 ICSID Report of the Executive Directors, I ICSID Rep. 31 (2006), cited in
SCHREUER, supra note 52, at 609. The International Court of Justice Statute provides
that:

1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: a. international conventions,
whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the
contesting states; b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law; c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means
for the determination of rules of law.
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex
aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.
The Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
58 See PETERSON, supra note 1, at 22.
s9 See ICJ Statute, supra note 57, art. 38.
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promote human rights, it is highly probable that human rights law
will be applicable.
International law can also come into play whether municipal
law is applied alone or together with international law. In both
situations, international law plays, with necessary modifications,
the same role.60 It fills potential gaps in the domestic legal order
and even rectifies it, if that order is incompatible with the
fundamental norms of international law." Thus, if national law is
incomplete in terms of human rights protection, or if it fails to
satisfy the standards set by international law concerning the socalled fundamental human rights, international law becomes the
applicable law62 to settle the dispute.63
It is important to note, however, that in the course of such
settlement, the investment-focused jurisdiction of arbitration
tribunals tends to limit the significance of the applicability of
international law. 4
2. Applicability Limited by Arbitrators'Jurisdiction
Investment treaties generally provide that disputes between an
investor and its host state that are subject to arbitration involve the
interpretation and the application of these treaties. 65 In other
words, the jurisdiction entrusted to arbitral tribunals is limited to
determining whether the provisions of an investment agreement
have been violated or not. Accordingly, no claim for the breach of
See SCHREUER, supranote 52, at 580-81, 583-87, 620-27.
61 International law can also be applied as part of domestic law. However, as
noted by Schreuer, "[ilt would not be wise to rely on the incorporation of international
law into a domestic law chosen by the parties as a general proposition." Id. at 582.
Indeed, "[t]he status of international law under domestic constitutions varies greatly."
Id
62 See id. at 590. Schreuer argues that this problem may be better dealt with in
terms of mandatory rules of international law than in terms of applicable law. Id.
60

63 See PETERSON, supra note 1, at 22.

64 See, e.g., Waste Management Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
2004), available at
85 (Apr. 30,
Final Award,
ARB(AF)/00/3,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/34643.pdf ("[T]here is no room for
implying into the treaty additional requirements . . . of general international law in the
field.").
65 See, e.g., Maniruzzaman, supra note 46, at 309 (discussing the issue of whether
arbiters' jurisdiction is limited to determining a breach or whether they may consider
public international law as well).
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any other rule of international law can be brought before an
investment arbitration tribunal.6 6 The potential role of human
rights law, as part of the applicable law in the settlement of
disputes, must be analyzed against the background of this wellHuman rights claims do not have
established jurisdiction.
autonomous standing before investment tribunals.6 7
However, in cases where the state has reacted to a systemic or
widespread human rights violation committed by an investor,
arbitrators may (at least in theory) reach the conclusion that they
lack jurisdiction or that they consider it inappropriate to consider
the merits of the case, despite officially having jurisdiction.6 ' This
proposition has been made in literature disseminated in connection
with dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade
Organization (WTO):
As a second way of dealing with predominantly non-WTO
disputes, one could argue that in certain extreme cases the
dispute no longer genuinely concerns WTO claims (even though
such claims could technically be made) but, rather, other rules of
international law that the WTO claims are inextricably linked to
and that these WTO claims are dependent on to be decided. In
such extreme cases it could then be submitted that the history,
prior procedures, and substantive content of the dispute indicate
that the real issue of the case (i.e., the genuine object of the
claim) is related to non-WTO claims as to which a WTO panel
does not have jurisdiction. On these grounds, the WTO panel
could either decide that it does not have substantive jurisdiction
over the dispute or find that it does have jurisdiction but does
not consider it appropriate to exercise this jurisdiction.6 9

66 See Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a

Species of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 121, 127 (2006) (discussing
the system of investment treaty arbitration).
67 See PETERSON, supra note 1, at 22 (noting that generally investment arbitrators
are "not empowered to find that human rights obligations have been breached" unless the
human rights laws "form a part of the backdrop against which investment treaty
obligations are read and applied").
68 See Joost Pauwelyn, The Role ofPublic InternationalLaw in the WTO: How Far
Can We Go?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 535, 558 (2001) (footnotes omitted).
69 Id
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Such a hypothesis is theoretically possible,70 but it is rather
unlikely to occur. Furthermore, the fact that sometimes a dispute
proves to be highly relevant to human rights should not be the
reason for an arbitration tribunal's refusal to exercise
jurisdiction." Rather, the tribunal should take this into account
and proceed with its determination of whether the investment
agreement has been violated.
In its final report on the issue of fragmentation, the
International Law Commission (hereinafter ILC) recalled that
whatever the scope of the jurisdiction of a judicial body, the
exercise of that jurisdiction "is controlled by the normative
environment."72 From the perspective of general international law,
the most efficient method for- taking this normative environment
into account is that of systemic integration.
B. IntroducingHuman Rights Norms into Investment
Arbitration through Interpretation
The rationale of the principle of systemic integration lies in the
fact that treaties, whatever their subject matter, do not operate in a
vacuum, but rather make part and parcel of the international legal
order.73 "All treaty provisions receive their force and validity from
general law, and set up rights and obligations that exist alongside
rights and obligations established by other treaty provisions and
rules of customary international law." 74 As Lord McNair
synthesized, treaties must be "applied and interpreted against the
background of the general principles of international law."75
Following this rationale, Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT enables

70 See generally John Barcelo, Who Decides the Arbitrators' Jurisdiction?
Separability and Competence-Competence in Transnational Perspective, 36 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1115, 1121 (2003) (discussing the application of the 'KompetenzKompetenz' principle which, in this situation, implicitly gives the WTO jurisdiction to
rule over their competence).
71 See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980
I.C.J. 3, 20 (May 24) (pointing out that "no provision of the Statute or Rules
contemplates that the Court should decline to take cognizance of one aspect of a dispute
merely because that dispute has other aspects, however very important").
72 See Int'l Law Comm'n Report, supra note 42, 45.
73 See Maniruzzaman, supra note 46, at 309.
74 Int'l Law Comm'n Report, supranote 42,1414.
75 LoRD McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 466 (2d ed. 1961).
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arbitration tribunals to apply and interpret investment treaties
against the background of international human rights law." This
article provides that "there should be taken into account, together
with the context . .. any relevant rules of international law
applicable in the relations between the parties."n The role of
systemic integration is to authorize judges and arbitrators to escape
the narrow confines of applicable law while remaining within their
jurisdiction and within the specific legal basis under which a claim
was brought before the tribunal." Further, it allows judges and
arbitrators to enrich their reasoning by referring to sources of
international law that, though extraneous to the respective
normative regime, are nevertheless relevant to the judicial issue in
question.7 9 Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT broadens the normative
horizons of a judge-not her competence. It simply allows her to
introduce the normative materials into the judicial analysis that
may be useful in delivering her judgment.
However, the advantages offered by the systemic integration
method of interpretation are somewhat blurred by the fact that
difficulties appear quite often in identifying the norms of
international law that may fall under the scope of Article 31(3)(c)
of the VCLT. Yet, despite these difficulties, Article 31(3)(c)
remains an important tool in the efforts of tribunals to bridge the
gap between human rights and investment law. Last but not least,
given the function of Article 31(3)(c) within the context of
investment arbitration and the fact that the toolbox of investment
law contains many of its own instruments to facilitate the tacit
introduction of human rights into judicial reasoning, one might
question the utility of systemic integration, especially in the
context of investment arbitration.
1. An Imperfect Tool: Difficulties in the Identificationof
the Human Right Norms Relevant between the Parties

Both the literature and case law on systemic integration are
significantly rich." The limited scope of this study requires a brief
76 See Int'l Law Comm'n Report, supra note 42, 1 420.
77 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 31, art. 31(3)(c).
78 See Int'l Law Comm'n Report, supra note 42, $T 17-23.
79 Seeid. 462-72.
80 See Isabelle Van Damme, Systemic Integration of International Law: Views
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discussion of the issues raised by systemic integration which are
the most relevant for the purpose of this article.
Reference to the "rules of international law" in Article 31(3)(c)
is generally interpreted as excluding the principles or
considerations that may not be firmly established as rules."' In
addition, the term "rules" encompasses all sources of international
law, including treaties, international custom and general principles
of international law. 82
The relevance of an extraneous rule must be determined in
light of the circumstances of each case. Here, the problem lies in
the vagueness of certain international human rights norms, such as
the sphere of application or minimum standards of conduct, which
often makes it difficult to determine their effect.83 Human rights
as a body of law is indeed partly composed of imprecise
standards. 84 This applies especially in the fields of economic,
social, and cultural rights, which are ruled by the logic of
"progressive fulfillment" and depend both upon the means that a
state possesses and its level of development.85 These rights are the
most relevant rights in the framework of investment treaty.
arbitration. Conscious of this problem, the U.N. Committee on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights has issued commentsespecially on the substantive implication of the right to wateraddressing some of the state measures necessary to ensure
fulfillment of its goals. 86
from the ILC, the WTO, CTE, and UNESCO, in

PROCEEDINGS OF THE CANADIAN

2005, at 59 (2006); see
also Benedetto Conforti, Units et fragmentation du droit international: "Glissez,
mortels, n'appuyez pas!," Ill REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INT'L PUBLIC 5, 19 (2007);
Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the
Vienna Convention, 54 INT'L & COMP. L.Q., 279, 280 (2005).
81 Int'l Law Comm'n Report, supra note 42,1426.
82 See id.11462-72.
83 See David Kinley & Rachel Chambers, UN Human Rights Norms for
Corporations: The Private Implications of Public International Law, 6 HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 447, 466 (2006) (considering complaints that international norms are vague).
84 See id.
85 See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment
No. 19: The Right to Social Security, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/19, (Feb. 4, 2008)
(discussing the need for "progressive fulfilment in economic, social and cultural rights").
86 See U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15:
The Right to Water, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003).
COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL LAw 34TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE
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Beyond the problem of imprecision within the realm of human
rights, which relates to the nature and degree of maturity of human
rights law, difficulties in the process of judicial interpretation are
also encountered from the side of systemic integration. These
problems are mainly caused by the uncertainties surrounding the
sphere of application and the meaning given to the text of Article
31(3)(c).87 However, as will be demonstrated, most of the issues
that have been brought to light by legal scholarship are of minor
importance within investment law.
The first-and most debated-issue concerns the meaning of
the term "parties" in Article 31(3)(c)." For the relevant rule of
international law to be integrated into judicial reasoning, it has "to
be applicable in the relations between the parties."89 Given the
status of general applicability recognized to customary law and the
general principles of law, this condition raises no difficulty for
such sources." On the other hand, a vivid debate arose, mainly in
the framework of the WTO, about the meaning of the term
"parties" in the context of conventional norms of international
law.9' Does Article 31(3)(c) refer to all parties to the treaty to be
interpreted, or simply to the two parties involved in the dispute?
In the EC-BiotechnicalProducts case, a WTO panel considered
the term "parties" to refer to the parties to the treaty to be
interpreted.92 Such an understanding has the paradoxical effect of

87 See, e.g., Demir v. Turkey, App. No. 34503/97, 48 EUR. H.R. REP. 1272 (2009)
(illustrating the confusion courts may have in interpreting Art. 31(3)(c) before the
European Court of Human Rights).
88 See Vassilis Tzevelekos, The Use of Article 31(3)(C) of the VCLT in the Case
Law of the ECtHR: An Effective Anti-FragmentationTool or a Selective Loopholefor the
Reinforcement of Human Rights Teleology-Between Evolution and Systemic
Integration,31 MICH. J. INT'L L. 621, 653-54 (2010).

89 Ulf Linderfalk, Who Are 'The Parties'?Article 31, Paragraph3(c) of the 1969
Vienna Convention and the 'Principleof Systemic Integration' Revisited, 55 NETH. INT'L
L. REV. 343, 345 (2008).

90 See Tzevelekos, supra note 88, at 653 (citing Duncan French, Treaty
Interpretationand the Incorporationof Extraneous Legal Rules, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
281, 307 (2006)).
91 See id. at 654-55 (citing JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW: How WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW 261 (2003)).
92 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting the
Approval and Marketing ofBiotech Products, WT/DS291-293/INTERIM 299 (Sept. 29,
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isolating a broadly ratified treaty from the rest of the conventional
rules of international law. The greater its membership, the less
likely that all of the states parties will also be parties to other
treaties.

However, as far as the specific question of investment

law is concerned, the dilemma in the interpretation of the term
"parties" in Article 31(3)(c) turns out to be of limited practical
importance. Since the great majority of investment agreements are
BITs, the parties to the dispute are the only parties to the
convention. 9 The bilateral nature of conventional investment
practice almost annihilates the possibility that in the context of
investment arbitration, one state party to the investment treaty
would not be party to the international treaty to which the arbitral
tribunal resorts via the method of systemic integration.95
Another sensitive issue concerns the time factor in the effect to
be given to Article 31(3)(c). 9 6 The question here is whether the
relevant rules of international law are only those that existed at the
time of the drafting of the treaty or whether the relative normative
evolution should be taken into account as well." A look at the
travaux prdparatoiresof the VCLT demonstrates that the question
of inter-temporality was a rather delicate topic, leading to a clash
between the supporters and opponents of the doctrine.9 8 In reality,
2006); see also Benn McGrady, Fragmentation of International Law or "Systemic
Integration" of Treaty Regimes: EC Biotech Products and the Proper Interpretation of
Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 42 J. WORLD TRADE
589, 607 (2008).
93 See Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights, 13 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 782, 790 (2002) (citing David Palmeter & Petros Mavroidis, The WTO Legal
System: Sources ofLaw, 92 AM. J.INT'L L. 398 (1998)); Pauwelyn, supra note 68, at 575
(suggesting this understanding can be technically rebutted). Article 31(2)(a) of the
VCLT, for example, refers to "all the parties," while Article 31(2)(b) mentions "one or
more of the parties" as well as "other parties." It could thus be inferred that the use in
Article 31(3)(c) of "parties" involves a subset of membership, which is less than the
unanimity and more than a few parties. In this sense, it is suggested in the literature
dealing with the WTO that it is enough that the non-WTO rule reflects only the
"common intention" of the WTO members, by being either agreed upon or tolerated.
94 See Pauwelyn, supra note 68, at 575.
95 But see Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 54 (standing as an example of an BIT
where the "parties" issue may be raised).
96 Tzevelekos, supra note 88, at 633-34.

9

See id

98 See DIETRICH RAUSCHNING & RALF GONTER WETZEL, THE VIENNA CONVENTION

ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 244 (1978).
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this question is closely connected to the issue of the "dynamic
interpretation" of treaties. 99 Indeed, Article 31(3)(c) serves as the
basis for both the dynamic and the systemic integration methods of
interpretation.100 However, in the context of investment law, the
doctrinal debates over the temporal dimension of Article 31(3)(c)
do not constitute a real problem. Given that the first BITs were
concluded in the 1960s"o' and that the explosion in the number of
BITs is a rather new phenomenon dating back only to the mid1980s, it is easy to conclude that the conventional investment
practice is mainly posterior (or at least contemporary) to the
human rights conventional practice within the UN framework in
the aftermath of World War 11.102
The aim of this above analysis is limited to a simple, general
overview of systemic integration. Systemic integration stems from
Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT, which has been considered one of
the main tools against the fragmentation of international law. 03
The main asset of this Article is to bridge the gap between
different regimes of international law; its main handicap derives
both from the nature of the regime of human rights-mainly the
vagueness in the semantic field and the effect of certain rightsand the unclear text of Article 31(3)(c).' 0 4 Nonetheless, despite the
problems in its effective application, no one can deny that Article
31(3)(c) constitutes a useful weapon in the arsenal of investment
arbitration.o' Thus, when the particular circumstances of a case
before an arbitral tribunal raise questions of human rights, it is left
99 Tzevelekos, supra note 88, at 635 (citing Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 58th
Sess., May 1-June 9, July 3-Aug. I1, 2006 1 251(4), (22), U.N. Doc. A/61/10; GAOR,
61st Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2006)).
100 See Panos Merkouris, Debating the Ouroboros of International Law: The
Drafting History of Article 31(3)(c), 9 INT'L COMMUNITY L. REV. 1, 11 (2007); see also

Tzevelekos, supra note 88, at 630-37.
1ot See Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, F.R.G.-Pak., Nov.
25, 1959, 457 U.N.T.S. 6575, 6631 (concluding the first BIT between Germany and
Pakistan in 1959 and noticeably not including investment arbitration).
102 See generally United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Bilateral
Investment Treaties 1959-1999, UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2 (2000) (tracing the number of and
history of bilateral investment treaties).
103 See Tzevelekos, supra note 88, at 636.
104 See id at 630-37.
105

See ISABELLE VAN DAMME, TREATY INTERPRETATION BY THE WTO APPELLATE

BODY 366-68 (2009).
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to the arbitrators to rely on systemic integration.10 6 International
law guarantees the applicability of norms that are relevant and
useful.1
Arbitrators are then expected to make use of these
norms, within the limits of the tribunal's jurisdiction, in order to
reach the judicial outcome that they deem as just and legitimate.os
What remains to be answered, however, is the precise function of
systemic interpretation. In other words, what effect will systemic
integration have on the case law of investment tribunals?
2. The Potentialof Systemic Integration in Investment
Arbitration
Although investment arbitration offers certain well-known
examples of tribunals resorting to international law in their judicial
reasoning, '1 references to the method of systemic integration
remain absent to date. What these examples have in common is
the objective pursued by the silent application of systemic
integration. Resorting to international law does not necessarily
reflect the will of tribunals to offer a view of the broader
normative environment within which investment law is located,
nor does it highlight the systemic bonds that exist between
investment law and international law."'0 Rather, arbitral tribunals
usually turn towards international law out of necessity."' They
turn to the source of normative elements as a refuge that, though
not forming part of the core of investment law, answers legal
questions. Often, in light of the particular facts of each case, these
questions cannot be answered by the provisions of the applicable
investment law. 112 No matter how important the will of the
contracting parties is in the regime of investment law, it does not
suffice to cover each and every scenario or legal question of a
106 See Tzevelekos, supra note 88, at 647.
107 See id
108 See id at 644.

109 See, e.g., Osvaldo Mazorati, Enforcement of Treaty Awards and National
Constitutions (the Argentinian Cases), 7 Bus. L. INT'L 226, 230 (2006) (referencing the
international law norms occurring in the so-called "Argentinian cases" in relation to the
argument of state of necessity).
110 See, e.g., id.
(discussing the available international law).
III
112

cases).

See id.

See, e.g., id. at 233-34 (citing the lack of applicable law in the Argentinian
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dispute."' Investment law is not a self-contained regime. The will
of the contracting parties is often lacunar; the only way to resolve
disputes and guarantee the effective application of the provisions
of investment law is to cover these gaps by resorting to general
international law.' 14
Such a method of systemic integration is highly unlikely to
concern human rights, however. In the scenario described here,
the role of systemic integration is to situate investment law within
the general system of international law and to interpret the former
in accordance with the systemic premises, logic, and economy of
the latter. With no regard to the importance of human rights, these
premises constitute just another regime within international lawnot the system itself. Hence, despite its usefulness, this specific
form of systemic integration does not concern, in principle, human
rights.
Nevertheless, an analysis of the effect of systemic integration
in regimes of international law, other than investment law,
demonstrates that in addition to this first scenario, Article 31(3)(c)
of the VCLT has been equally applied in two other instances."
The first and most important issue is that of conflict of norms." 6
As these studies suggest, in case of a conflict between
international law norms, systemic integration comes into play ipso
facto."7 Furthermore, given the expansion in the effect of human
rights, host states may relatively easily-and convenientlysustain that virtually all measures they apply are dictated by the
various obligations they have under international law to protect
human rights."' In the case of civil and political rights, beyond
the classic abstention from interfering with human liberties, states
are equally expected to adopt positive measures aimed at
protecting these liberties."' The positive effect of these rights
extends well beyond the classic state versus individual effect and

113 See, e.g., id

114 See Tzevelekos, supra note 88, at 670.
115 See id.
at 669.
116 See id. at 665-70.
117 See id at 671 (citing Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 31 (1995)
as an example).
It8 Seeidat670-73.
I' 9 Id at 639.
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moves in the direction of indirect horizontal effect. 120 As far as
social and economic rights are concerned, states are expected to
equally protect, promote, and progressively fulfill these rights.'2 1
This very multidimensional nature of human rights protection and
promotion requires states to develop policies aimed at
progressively offering better living conditions to their citizens. 122
Vast areas of domestic policy (e.g., social policy, tax policy,
economic policy, and labor policy) can be linked-if albeit
indirectly-to international human rights.123 Thus, most, if not all,
conflicts between the interests of investors and those of host states
may be translated into a conflict between the obligations that a
host state has under investment law vis-i-vis the investor and the
obligations it has vis-4-vis other states (if not the international
community, as in the case of obligations erga omnes) in the field
of the protecting and promoting of human rights.'24
Systemic integration is, therefore, an option for international
investment arbitration in order to introduce into judicial
reasoning-through a conflicting norm approach-human rights
norms of international law. However, in the case of a conflict of
norms, the function of systemic integration is limited to simply
drawing out the conflict between norms.' 25 It does not offer any
solutions for the conflict itself.'26 Even if an investment tribunal
opts to a claim brought by an investor against a state from
investment law norms to international human rights norms, the
tribunal still needs to resolve this conflict. 127 In this case, the
systemic integration method of interpretation will have to be
complemented by the classic tools for conflict resolution such as

See id
See id.
122 See id at 644.
123 See Tzevelekos, supra note 88, at 644-45.
124 See id. at 641-45.
125 See Nele Matz-Liick, Harmonization, Systemic Integration, and 'Mutual
Supportiveness' as Conflict-Solution Techniques: Different Modes of Interpretationas a
Challenge to Negative Effects of Fragmentation, 2006 FINNISH Y.B. INT'L L. 37, 50
(2006); McGrady, supra note 92, at 607; Tzevelekos, supra note 88, at 686.
126 See Tzevelekos, supra note 88, at 686-87.
127 See, e.g., id (discussing how courts will often generalize international law to fill
120
121

in the blanks).
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lex specialis and hierarchy of norms. 128
Yet, given that the first aim in the case of conflict of norms is
reconciliation, arbitrators will be expected to pursue
harmonization of conflicting rights via the principle of
proportionality (i.e., establishing of priorities in the fulfillment of
legal obligations in light of the particular circumstances of the
case). 129 However, as it will be demonstrated in Part III,
proportionality is also a well-known technique within the regime
of investment law, and occupies a central role in balancing the
interests of the investor against public and general interest.o In
short, both in the cases of conflict of norms (through systemic
integration) and conflict of interests (the traditional way of
reasoning in investment law), the logic is the same.' 31 The only
major change is the legal etiquette (i.e., legal formalism). 132
Substance, however, remains unaffected.'3 3
The third and final function of systemic integration is
particularly effective in the case of complementarity of norms.'34
According to this third use of systemic integration, investment
arbitrators may apply Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT to integrate
normative elements into their reasoning that are complementary to
elements inherent in their own legal regime. "' This scenario
applies equally to the normative elements within the regime of
investment law that refer to the protection of the investor as well
as the elements that refer to the protection of public and general
interest. 136
Hence, systemic integration in the case of

128 See generally id. at 653-54 (discussing how both lex specialis and a hierarchy of
norms may exist in how courts apply such methodologies).
129 See Elizabeth Snodgrass, Protecting Investors' Legitimate Expectations:
Recognizing and Delimiting a General Principle,21 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 1, 46
(2006).
130 See discussion infra Part III.
131 See discussion infra Part III.
132 See Tzevelekos, supra note 88, at 633 (discussing the static nature of systemic
integration).
133 See id at 661.
134 See id at 647-65.
135 See id at 64748.
136 See generally R. DOLZER & C. SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW (Oxford Univ. Press 2008) (discussing the standards used to provide
fair and equitable treatment and protection and security to the investors as well as taking
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complementarity may be applied both to reinforce the rights
provided by investment agreements to the investor as well as to
limit these rights for the benefit of the public and general interest,
the way this concept is defined in light of international human
rights law.'
Once again, however, the normative elements that would be
integrated into judicial reasoning are not sufficient per se to draw
conclusions about the effect to be given to the relevant provisions
of human rights law. The overall end-goal of human rights is on a
collision course with the rights of the investor; the only way to
strike a balance is to proceed again with a proper and in-depth test
of proportionality. This is exactly the subject of Part III. The
reference to proportionality brings us back to the scenarios of
conflict of norms (via systemic integration) or to conflict of
interests (via the classical reasoning followed so far by investment
tribunals). As it has already been said, these two options coincide
substantively.' Their logic, in essence and in nature, are, if not
identical, at least similar.' 9 The question thus remains: if the
hypothesis of this paper is correct and, indeed, the regime of
investment law already contains a number of tools which allow
introduction of the end-goals of human rights to investment law
through the concepts of public and general interest, what is the
usefulness or comparative advantage of systemic integration?
One may answer this question by referring to the existing
empirical data, which clearly suggests that systemic integration is
absent from investment arbitration.'4 0 Hence, one could conclude
that this is proof of the validity of the analysis so far-suggesting
that, in reality, systemic integration cannot offer any original
solutions and that, in substance, it can only function either as an
elliptic substitute or as a complement.14' The first case concerns
the conflict of norms between investment rights and human rights;
whereas the second emphasizes the norms of international law

consideration of the public/general interest).
137

See id.

See discussion infra Part III.
139 See Tzevelekos, supra note 88, at 649-51.
140 See Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article
30(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, 54 INT'L & COMP L.Q. 279, 280-82 (2005).
141 See discussion infra Part Ill.
138
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complementary to the normative conflicting elements that are
traditionally harmonized through the classic interpretative process
followed by investment tribunals. 142 However, such an answer
ignores the fact that systemic integration is a relatively new
technique which has only recently been introduced to the
vocabulary of international lawyers by the ILC.14 3
Despite its obvious insufficiencies, systematic integration
offers a number of clear advantages.144 It brings all the useful and
necessary normative elements under the same roof. "' Thus, it
covers all normative aspects of a case by analyzing its normative
dimensions in depth, increasing the legitimacy of reasoning
through the method of comparison, and overall, bridging the
regime of investment law with different (potentially conflicting)
regimes of international law and tying these regimes around the
general system of international law.146
Thus, the analysis that follows-presenting the tools that are
inherent to the regime of investment law and allowing for
balancing the interests of the investor against public and general
interest, including human rights-should not be read as an effort to
undermine the usefulness of systemic integration. When the latter
is not complementary to the mechanism that is analyzed below, it
is parallel to it; it simply facilitates shifting from a conflict of
interests to a conflict of norms. 147 Conflict in both scenarios
remains the key word. The only available solution for any type of
conflict is proportionality. In most cases, the application of
proportionality leads to a certain degree of harmonization. In
other words, in the case of a failure to obtain a balanced,
legitimate harmonization, states will have to give priority to one of
the two conflicting and mutually exclusive obligations and
interests.148 When this happens, a state will have to suffer all the
142

See McLachlan, supra note 140, at 294.

143 See, e.g., id.
144 See Tzevelekos, supra note 88, at 649-51 (listing advantages such as generously
providing the court with valuable normative "loans," offering judges an opportunity to
appear greatly respectful of general international law, and thereby increasing the
legitimacy of judgments).
145 See id.
146 See id.
147 See id. at 665-67.
148 See id at 674 (citing Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Resolution:
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consequences for its wrongful conduct under international law.'4 9
Hence, if restitution is impossible, the state will be expected to
compensate and give satisfaction to the victims of the wrongful
action in question."so However, as already explained, given the
limitations in the competence of investment tribunals, the victim
can only be an investor. 15' Human rights victims may have
standing only before domestic courts or before a specialized,
competent international human rights forum.152
Human Rights as a General Interest Within
Investment Treaty Arbitration
Leaving aside Article 31(3)(c)' and its undeniable usefulness
in protecting human rights values and interests, this section will
prove that an equivalent result, a judicial outcome equally
respectful of human rights, may be reached without applying the
systemic integration method of interpretation. The regime of
investment law contains a number of tools, the use of which
guarantees that the necessary latitude is given to state authorities
so that they may legally interfere with the rights of the investor for
the purpose of protection and gradual promotion of human
rights.154 The concept of public and general interest is the key
issue. Its content is defined ad hoc on the basis of the
circumstances of each case, given the realities and the needs of
each society.'"' Public and general interest corresponds to a matrix
concept, pertinent to accommodate each and every legitimate
III.

Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Annex, U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/56/L.20; U.N. GAOR 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, art. 48(1) (Nov. 12, 2001)).
149 See Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Resolution: Responsibility of States for
InternationallyWrongful Acts, art.28, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/56/L.20.
150 See id., art. 36-37.
151 See supratext accompanying notes 14-18.
152 See Tzevelekos, supra note 88, at 673-74.
153 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 31.
154 See August Reinisch, The Prolhferation of International Dispute Settlement
Mechanisms: The Threat of Fragmentationvs. the Promise of a More Effective System?:
Some Reflections from the Perspective ofInvestment Arbitration,in INTERNATIONAL LAW
BETWEEN UNIVERSALISM AND FRAGMENTATION 123 (Isabelle Buffard et al. eds., 2008)

(discussing the various tools for enforcing investment law).
155 See Tzevelekos, supra note 88, at 681 (citing Bosphorus v. Ireland, 2005-VI
Eur. Ct. H.R. 107).
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interest or value of the society, including human rights.'1 6
As already explained, the first issue examined is the means that
investment law utilizes to encapsulate human rights values within
the concept of a public and general interest. The ethos of
international investment law is defined here as schizophrenic; it
aims to equally promote the development of the local population,
represented by the host state, and to protect the interests of the
investor. 1' Section (A) will provide an overview of the
schizophrenic ethos of investment law. Section (B) then analyzes
the tools of conciliation for balancing the public and general
interest against the interests of the investor. This section examines
the two guiding principles of interpretion, i.e., the legitimate
expectations and the distinct-investment-backed expectations 15
and how these two principles are being used to assess the legality
of state measures in relation to the FET clause and the prohibition
of indirect expropriation. These mechanisms of interpretation
described below balance the interests of the investor with human
rights interests and assess whether these interests carry such
weight that they may legitimately pass over those of the
investor.159 The inalienable condition for such a balancing is that
the rights granted by investment agreements to investors are not
absolute. It must be determined for each case whether the investor
is entitled to conventional protection. 160 This is exactly the
function of proportionality that is the overall principle governing
the mechanisms analyzed below.
A. The Schizophrenic Ethos ofInternationalInvestment Law
International investment law is often considered as overprotecting investors to such an extent that it could be re-labeled
"investor rights law." "' This due mainly to the fact that the
See id. (using Bosphorus v. Ireland as an example of the general interest
balancing).
157 See Reinisch, supra note 154, at 123.
158 See discussion infra Part III.A.2.b.
159 See discussion infra Part III.B.2.a.
160 See supra text accompanying notes 21-23.
161 See generally Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV.
FOREIGN INV. L.J. 232 (1995). Such a perception is due to some of the features of the
investment law regime, both substantial and procedural, such as the provision of rights
only to investors, their lack of obligations, and "arbitration without privacy." Id.
156
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system is judged solely from the viewpoint of the interests of
investors. 162 Yet, the interests protected and promoted by
international investment law are not only those of investors. 163
Investment law also promotes the interests of the states and of
their population. '" It is from this perspective that the Amco
tribunal argued that "the Convention [ICSID Convention] is aimed
to protect,, to the same extent and with the same vigour, the
investor and the host State, not forgetting that to protect
investment is to protect the general interest of development and of
developing countries."' 6 ' The international investment law system
is made of this schizophrenic ethos, and its normative substance
allows the conciliation of the two objectives of protecting both
investor and public interests.16 6
1. The InternalDuality ofInterests
To be aware of the. schizophrenia of the objectives of the
international investment system, it is useful to look back at the
genesis of the system. Because of the abusive recourse to
investment treaty arbitration by a few investors through arbitration
without privity, as well as the prejudices surrounding this field, it
is argued that one has forgotten that the protection granted to
investors aims primarily to promote the development of host
states. 167
a. The Promotion of State Development as the
PrimaryObjective
The first paragraph of the Preamble of the ICSID Convention
identifies the need for international cooperation to promote the

162 See Int'l Law Comm'n Report, supra note 42, 21 ("[T]he characterizations
['trade law', 'environmental law'] have no normative value per se and are only informal
labels that describe the instruments from the perspective of different interests or different
policy objectives.").
163 See Kate Miles, International Investment Law: Origins, Imperialism and
Conceptualizingthe Environment, 21 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 2 (2010).
164 See id.

165 Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indon., ICSID Case No. ARB/81/01, Award
on Jurisdiction, 23 (Sept. 24 1985), 1 ICSID Rep. 389 (1993).
166 See Miles, supra note 163, at 2.
167 See id.
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economic development of the state as its first objective.'6 8 What
does this notion of economic development encompass? To answer
this question, one must start with the political context that gave
birth to the ICSID Convention.
At the time of the creation of the ICSID Convention, colonized
countries were becoming independent and starting to claim their
right to development under the banner of the New International
Economic Order. 169 Their claim called for sovereignty over
natural resources and for solidarity of the former colonized
countries towards the newly independent nations. 170 Such
demands were motivated by the economic difficulties faced by
these countries. 171 Furthermore, it is well-attested that the
economic situation of states has a direct impact on their ability to
promote human rights, especially social and economic ones. 172
This is the reason why Article 2.1 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights provides:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take
steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of
its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively
the full realization of the rights recognized in the present
Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the
adoption of legislative measures.1 73
Considering this link between human rights and the economic
condition of states, development turns into a key tool for
effectiveness in the promotion of human rights.' 7 4 Thus, if the
system of international investment law aims to promote the
168 See ICSID Convention, supra note 52, at pmbl. I ("Considering the need for
international cooperation for economic development, and the role of private international
investment therein . . . .").
169 See
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The ICSID Convention: Origins and
Transformation, 38 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 47, 54 (2009).
170 See id. at 50.
171 See id
172 See id
173 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 2(1), Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 17 (emphasis added).

174 See id. at 5.
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economic development of states, then it equally pursues, albeit
indirectly, human rights objectives, as well.'
This conclusion becomes even more obvious considering the
evolution of the content of the right to development. 176 This
evolution is well symbolized by the semantic passage from "droit
du ddveloppement" to "droit au ddveloppement," which highlights
the difference between states' right to development and
development as an individual right of the human being.177 Under
the latter, development is no longer only "a comprehensive
economic, social, cultural and political process . . . .""' In terms

of Article 1.1 of the General Assembly UN Declaration on the
Right to Development:
[T]he right to development is an inalienable human right by
virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled
to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social,
cultural and political development, in which all human rights
and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.179
Hence, to the extent that the human being is considered to be
"the central subject of development,"' she can be equally viewed
as the central subject of international investment law. From this
perspective, the protection of investors aims also to promote
human rights.
b. The Protection of the Interests of the Investor as
the Secondary Objective
It appears then that the protection granted to investors by
international investment law is a way of favouring development,
rather than an objective per se.'8 ' In this sense, the Joseph Charles

175 See id.
176

Id.

177 PIERRE-MARIE DupuY, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIc 715 (8th ed. 2006).
178 Declaration on the Right to Development, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128, art. 2(Dec.

4 1986).
179 Id. art. 1(1).
180 Id. art. 2(1).
181 See Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on

Jurisdiction

and

Liability,

1j

273

(Jan.

21,

2010),

available

at
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Lemire Tribunal considered:
The object and purpose of the BIT-the third interpretive
criterion-is defined in its Preamble: the parties "desir[e] to
promote greater economic cooperation between them, with
respect to investment by nationals and companies of one Party in
the territory of the other Party" and recognize that the BIT "will
stimulate the flow of private capital and the economic
development of the Parties." The main purpose of the BIT is
thus the stimulation of foreign investment and of the
accompanying flow of capital. But this main purpose is not
sought in the abstract; it is inserted in a wider context, the
economic development for both signatory countries. Economic
development is an objective which must benefit all, primarily
national citizens and national companies, and secondarily
foreign investors. Thus, the object and purpose of the Treaty is
not to protect foreign investments per se, but as an aid to the
development of the domestic economy.182
More specifically, this secondary purpose is an indirect one.
The protection granted to investors is a necessary means for
encouraging and promoting the investments that are essential for
the development of host states. 83
This need to protect investors from host states is deeply rooted
in the historical background of modem international investment
law.' 84 By the end of the nineteenth century and throughout the
twentieth century, investors were dependent on host states, risking
being expropriated or discriminated against without being granted
any compensation.'
Such unevenness also finds its origins in the
weakness of individuals in relation to state power. There is no
room here to retrace the balancing process that took place
throughout the twentieth century. 186 The balancing process

http://italaw.com/documents/Lemirev.Ukraine20I0.pdf
182 See id. 1J 271-73.
183 See id.
184 See Miles, supra note 163, at 2-3.
185 See Charles Leben, La theorie du contrat d'dtat et l'dvoltion du droit
internationaldes investissements, in 302 RECUEIL DES COURS 197, 200 (2003).
186 Id. at 197.
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occurred by way of the internationalizing of both the dispute
settlement mechanism and the applicable law, first through states'
contracts and then by way of investment treaties.18 7
The need to balance the relationship between investors and
states partly explains why investment agreements usually provide
only for the rights of the investor.1 8 This need also explains why
the instrumental dimension of this objective has been forgotten in
the balancing process.' 89 The emphasis placed on the protection of
investors has led to the belief that such protection is to be absolute,
and that arbitration tribunals tend to always rule in favour of
investors. 190 However, careful analysis of the relevant arbitral
practice indicates that arbitrators are neither agents of the investor
nor cash registers of her claims. The liability of the host state is
not founded on the basis of the arguments of the claimants, but
rather on treaty provisions that by no means confer absolute rights
on the investor.' 9'
2. The Internal Tools of Conciliation
Having concluded that the international investment law regime
aims to protect both the public and general interest as well as the
interests of investors, this section analyzes the internal tools of
The misleading
reconciling these two conflicting interests.
rights is
absolute
granted
are
contention as to which investors
mainly due to the broad and vague wording of certain investment
treaty provisions (such as the FET and the prohibition of indirect
expropriation). 192 These features are deemed to lead to the
paralysis of the normative power of host states. If the rights of the
investor were absolute, then states could only exercise sovereignty
and, more specifically, could only comply with their human rights
obligations to the extent that their practice would not affect the

187

See id

188

See Miles, supra note 163, at 8-9.
Id

189

190 See id
191 See id

192 See Christoph H. Schreuer, Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET): Interactions
with Other Standards, in INVESTMENT PROTECTION AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY

63, 65 (Graham Coop & Clarisse Ribeiro eds., 2008).
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Rejecting this logic, this article

emphasizes that, in reality, investment rights imply the modulation
of the conventional protections granted to the investor. Hence, to
administer the provisions of investment agreements, arbitration
tribunals increasingly have recourse to the concepts that guide the
administration-the legitimate expectations and the distinctinvestment-backed expectations.19 4
The first part of this section addresses the issue of the
administration of treaty provisions from the perspective of
legitimacy, arguing that the legitimacy of the "normative" power
of arbitrators stems from the will of states. The second part
introduces the guiding principles of interpretation: the legitimate
expectations principle and the distinct-investment-backed
expectations principle. The study analyzes the function of these
principles in domestic and investment law.
a. The Administration of Treaty Provisions
The "international investment law system" is a heterogeneous
field where conflicts of interests often arise and involve
complicated factual situations. 195
Therefore, the relevant
normative framework must be capable of covering the numerous
situations that can occur when taking account of their specificities.
Given the practical impossibility of dealing with each and every
factual situation in the framework of a single treaty, the parties to
investment treaties must make a practical decision to provide for
broadly-worded provisions. 196 By including these provisions
within investment treaties, state-parties tend to delegate a quasinormative power to arbitrators, putting them in charge of the
administration of international investment law.' 97 The nature of
that role explains why arbitrators are required to be experts
competent enough to deal with complex situations involving both
legal and economic issues.198

193

See id.

194

Id.
Susan D. Franck, The Role of InternationalArbitrators, 12 ILSA J. INT'L &

195

COMP. L. 499, 512 (2006).
196
197

See id.
See id.

198 In relation to situations involving human rights law, one can wonder whether he
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At the same time, this quasi-normative power is subject to live
criticism' 99 putting at stake the discretion which arbitrators enjoy
in performing their task in a field that is closely connected to the
public policy choices of states. 200 In this context, arbitrary
decisions have led in the past to the characterization of arbitrators
as the agents of the investor, thereby illegitimately paralyzing the
regulatory power of states.20 1
As for the overall question of legitimacy, one needs to
remember that, at the international level, the traditional source of
legitimacy stems from the will of states. 20 2 Arbitrators draw their
legitimacy from the will of the state-parties that empowered them
to settle a dispute.203 In a similar way, the breathing space they
enjoy in applying these provisions is only due to the political
choice that states made to establish such norms through their
various investment agreements. 204 In doing so, states are
responsible for the room left to the discretion of arbitrators in. the
assessment of the legality of measures involving public and
general interest. However, discretion is not to be equated to
arbitrariness. In between these two concepts lies a gap that is not
bridged by arbitration tribunals. The practice of investment
tribunals usually demonstrates the cautiousness of arbitrators when
exercising their judicial functions. 205 By the means of
interpretation, and especially through the two guiding principles
analyzed below, arbitrators strike a balance between the interests

or she has a sufficient knowledge of this field of law. Such a question is all the more
relevant since human rights law is partly made of imprecise norms and obligations.
199 Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is ArbitrationA Threat or A Boon to
the Legitimacy ofInternationalInvestment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 471, 490 (2009).
200 See id
201 See Christian Chavagneux, Lumiere sur I'AA4I: le test de Dracula
I'Observatoirede la mondialisation,in ALTERNATIVES ECONOMIQUES 75, 92 (Dec. 1998),
http://www.altematives-economiques.fr/lumiere-ssur-l-ami-le-test-deavailable at
dracula-l-observatorie-de-la-mondialisation fr art_120 12046.html.
202 See Brower & Schill, supra note 199, at 473.
203 Id.
204 Id
205 See Charles Leben, La libertd normative de l'Etat et la question de
1'expropriationindirecte, in LEBEN (dir.), LE CONTENTIEUX ARBITRAL TRANSNATIONAL
RELATIFF A L'INVESTISSEMENT - NOUVEAUX DEVELOPPEMENTS 179, 179-83 (2005)
[hereinafter Leben, La liberid].

2012]

HUMAN RIGHTS IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION

1145

of states (i.e., the interests of local societies) and those of the

investor.20 6 In doing so, they increasingly have recourse to the two
guiding principles of legitimate expectations and of distinctinvestment-backed expectations.20 7
b. The Two GuidingPrinciplesofInterpretation:
Legitimate Expectations and Distinct-InvestmentBacked Expectations
Arbitration tribunals have increasingly referred to investors'
legitimate expectations when assessing whether host states are in
breach of their conventional obligations, especially in relation to
the FET provision and the provision on indirect expropriation.20 8
Despite the inchoate and inconsistent arbitration practice, a close
analysis reveals that the way arbitrators test the existence and the
legitimacy of investors' expectations tends to differ in relation to
the types of claim. 2 09 As far as the FET provision is concerned,2 10
they consider the basis of a special commitment or representation
granted to the investor. 2 1' Beyond this common basis, they tend to

206 See Brower & Schill, supra note 199, at 496.
207

Id

208 See generally Chester Brown, The Protection of Legitimate Expectations as a
'General Principle of Law': Some Preliminary Thoughts, in 6 TRANSNAT'L DiSp. MGMT
(2009) (explaining that this increasing arbitration practice triggers an inflation in the
academic literature about legitimate expectations in international investment law); see
also Stephen Fietta, Expropriation and the "Fair and Equitable" Standard The
Developing Role of Investors' "Expectations" in International Investment Arbitration,
23 J. INT'L ARB. 375, 380 (2006); Francisco Orrego Vicuna, Regulatory Authority and
Legitimate Expectations: Balancing the Rights of the State and the Individual under
International Law in a Global Society, 5 INT'L L. FORUM Du DROIT INT'L 188, 200
(2003); A. von Walter, The Investor's Expectations in International Investment
Arbitration,6 TRANSNAT'L DIsp. MGMT. 1, 23 (2009).
209 See Fietta,supra note 208, at 377-78.
210 See Int'l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, NAFTA Arb.
Trib.,
Dissent,
T
37
(2006),
available
at
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Mexico/Thunderbird/Thunderbird Dissent.pdf
("One can observe over the last years a significant growth in the role and scope of the
legitimate expectation principle, from an earlier function as a subsidiary interpretative
principle to reinforce a particular interpretative approach chosen, to its current role as a
self-standing subcategory and independent basis for a claim under the 'fair and equitable
standard' as under Art. 1105 of the NAFTA.").
211 See Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S v. Islamic Republic of Pak.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, T 240 (Nov. 14, 2005), available
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differ in the manner they assess the existence and the legitimacy of
expectations.212 The main divergence relates to hard cases where it
may be doubted that any special commitment or representation
Some arbitration tribunals
grounds legitimate expectations.
consider that investors' bear an obligation of diligence, investors
having to assess whether the representation at stake can ground a
legitimate expectation. 2 13 On the other hand, other arbitrators
opine that doubt plays in favour of investors, therefore their
expectations should be considered legitimate. 214 This issue will be

at http://italaw.com/documents/Bayandiraward.pdf. A few tribunals took account of the
host state law and even of policies at the time the investment was made to assess
investor's legitimate expectations. Id. See also Saluka Investments BV (Neth.) v. The
Czech Republic, Partial Award, 11 301-02 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006), available at
http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/SAL-CZ%20Partial%20Award%20170306.pdf.
212 See Saluka Investments BV (Neth.) v. The Czech Republic, Partial Award, f
301-02 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006), available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/SALCZ%20Partial%20Award%20170306.pdf.
213 See Olguin v. Para., ICSID Case No. ARB/98/526, Award, 75 (Jul. 26, 2001),
availableat http://italaw.com/documents/Olgun-award-en.pdf ("This Tribunal [does] not
accept Mr. Olguin's contention that he was induced to make his investment by the
bulletins issued by the Central Bank of Paraguay. To the contrary, the Tribunal feels that
prudence would have prompted a foreigner arriving in a country that had suffered severe
economic problems to be much more conservative in his investments.").
214 See Int'l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, Dissent, 11 3233,
[A] legitimate expectation is assumed more readily if an individual investor
receives specifically formal assurances that display visibly an official
character and if the official(s) perceive or should perceive that the investor
intends, reasonably, to rely on such representation. The strongest way to
build a legitimate expectation is if both formal and official elements are
followed and reinforced by conduct that carries the same message as the
investor reads-and can reasonably read-into an interpretative assurance or
"comfort letter" . . . [i]f the parties are in an equal position, a much higher
degree of due diligence is justified, as for example in inter-state relations
under conventional international law, in WTO law or in transnational
commercial relations, as usually adjudicated in international commercial
arbitration. Strong parties in an equal position can be expected to deploy
more expertise and due diligence to minimise ambiguity in their dealings
with each other. Nor can the same requirements as in national judicial
review of administrative actions be applied as the foreign investor is in a
much more vulnerable, exposed position than a national citizen confronting
his administration before national courts.
Id.
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discussed further in Part IV. 2 15 If the first line of reasoning is
based on the argument that risk is part of an investment operation,
the second one relies upon the weakness of the investor in front of
host states. Despite these divergences, by basing their reasoning
on a state's special representation or commitment, arbitrators rely
on the legitimate expectations principle as developed in domestic
administrative law.
When it comes to the indirect expropriation provision,
arbitration tribunals take account of all the circumstances-and
not only a special commitment or representation 2 16 _to assess the
existence and legitimacy of investors' expectations.2 17 In doing so,
they disagree on the priority that should be given to the relevant
While some arbitration tribunals emphasize
circumstances.
investors' economic expectations,2 18 others assess them in light of
the overall circumstances, for instance, by looking at whether the
investment was made in a highly regulated sector 2 19 or whether

See discussion infra Part IV.
See Fietta, supra note 208, at 384. It can be inferred from arbitration practice
that a breach of an investor's legitimate expectations based on a specific commitment or
representation when any form of neutralization or destruction of the investment has
occurred does not entail a breach of the indirect expropriation provision. Id. But see
Methanex v. United States, NAFTA Arb. Trib., Final Award, 7 (Aug. 3, 2005) ("as a
matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation for a public purpose,
which is enacted in accordance with due process and, which affects, inter alias, a foreign
investor or investment is not deemed expropriatory and compensable unless specific
commitments had been given by the regulating government to the then putative foreign
investor contemplating investment that the government would refrain from such
regulation").
217 See Fietta, supra note 208, at 392 (claiming that "this aspect of the Methanex
tribunal's analysis would have been far more relevant to its analysis of the Article 1105
[NAFTA's FET provision] than to questions of expropriation under Article 1110.").
218 See Telenor Mobile Communications A.S. v. Republic of Hung., ICSID Case
(Sept.
13,
2006),
available at
ARB/04/15,
Award,
70
No.
considering
whether
("In
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/itn telenor hungary.pdf
measures taken by government constitute expropriation the determinative factors are the
intensity and duration of the economic deprivation suffered by the investor as the result
of them").
219 See Feldman v. Mex., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award on Merits,
112
(Dec. 16, 2002), available at http://italaw.com/documents/feldman mexico-awardenglish.pdf ("To paraphrase Azinian, not all government regulatory activity that makes it
difficult or impossible for an investor to carry out a particular business, change in the law
or change in the application of existing laws that makes it uneconomical to continue a
particular business, is an expropriation under Article 1110. Governments, in their
215

216

1148

N.C. J. INT'L L. &COM. REG.

[Vol. XXXVII

expectations were overly optimistic. 220 Beyond the varying
importance afforded to these circumstances, arbitrators'
consideration traces back to the U.S. principle of distinctinvestment-backed expectations22 as it was elaborated upon in
relation to the Fifth Amendment protecting the right to property. 2 22
From this perspective, it is not surprising that conventional U.S.
investment practice introduced the principle of distinctinvestment-backed expectations to help assess whether an indirect
expropriation provision was breached. 22 3
exercise of regulatory power, frequently change their laws and regulations in response to
changing economic circumstances or changing political, economic or social
considerations. Those changes may well make certain activities less profitable or even
uneconomic to continue.").
220 See Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/3,
Final Award, 1
177 (Apr. 30, 2004), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/34643.pdf ("[I]t is not the function of the
international law of expropriation as reflected in Article 1110 to eliminate the normal
commercial risks of a foreign investor, or to place on Mexico the burden of
compensating for the failure of a business plan which was, in the circumstances, founded
on too narrow a client base and dependent for its success on unsustainable assumptions
about customer uptake and contractual performance").
221 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
222 Id.
223 Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of [Country] Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment (2004), Model BIT, Annex B:
Expropriation The Parties confirm their shared understanding that: 1. Article
6 [Expropriation and Compensation] is intended to reflect customary
international law concerning the obligation of States with respect to
expropriation. 2. An action or a series of actions by a Party cannot constitute
an expropriation unless it interferes with a tangible or intangible property
right or property interest in an investment. 3. Article 6 [Expropriation and
Compensation] addresses two situations. The first is direct expropriation,
where an investment is nationalized or otherwise directly expropriated
through formal transfer of title or outright seizure. 4. The second situation
addressed by Article 6 [Expropriation and Compensation] is indirect
expropriation, where an action or series of actions by a Party has an effect
equivalent to direct expropriation without formal transfer of title or outright
seizure. (a) The determination of whether an action or series of actions by a
Party, in a specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation,
requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among other
factors: (i) the economic impact of the government action, although the fact
that an action or series of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the
economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not establish that an
indirect expropriation has occurred; (ii) the extent to which the government
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Given the recent and inconsistent way that arbitration tribunals
refer to the legitimate expectation principle and the distinctinvestment-backed expectations principle, this section aims to
clarify these principles in light of their domestic law background.
The purpose is not to assess arbitration practice, but rather to equip
arbitration tribunals with clear and well-developed practices to
apply in situations where a human rights state measure is thought
to breach investment conventions.
1. The Legitimate Expectations Principle
The concept of legitimate expectations is rooted in municipal
law and, more precisely, in administrative law.224 It is a common
concept in many countries in Europe, and the aim is to strike a
balance between the state's freedom to regulate and private
individuals' or corporations' protection. 225 Beyond any
divergences in the definition and function of the principle within
each national order,226 the common core of legitimate expectations
obeys the following rationale: a person granted with an individual
right cannot be deprived of this right by an administrative
measure, unless the measure is justified by a public and general
interest. 227 Taking this rationale into account, 228 domestic courts
action interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations;
and (iii) the character of the government action. (b) Except in rare
circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are
designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as
public health, safety and the environment, do not constitute indirect
expropriations.
Id. (emphasis added).
224 See Fietta,supra note 208, at 384.
225 See Case 112/77, August T6pfer Co. GmbH v. Comm'n, 1978 E.C.R. 1019,1 19
(1978). The ECJ introduced legitimate expectations into its review of the legality in the
1970s and this Court considers that it "forms part of the Community legal order." Id.
226 See P.P. Craig, Legitimate Expectations: A Conceptual Analysis, 108 LAW Q.
REV. 79, 82 (1992); P.P. Craig, Substantive Legitimate Expectations in Domestic and
Community Law, 55 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 289, 290 (1996).
227 See ROBERT THOMAS, LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS AND PROPORTIONALITY IN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 41 (2000) ("This principle of legitimate expectations concerns the
relationship between public administration and the individual. It seeks to resolve the
basic conflict between the desire to protect the individual's confidence in expectations
raised by administrative conduct and the need for administrators to pursue changing
policy objectives. The principle means that expectations raised as a result of
administrative conduct may have legal consequences. Either the administration must
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traditionally apply a two-step test.22 9
First, courts assess whether a person indeed has certain
legitimate expectations.2 30 Such expectations are established on
the basis of an administrative decision, representation, or
practice-the form of which is subject to few formal
requirements.231 To qualify as a legitimate expectation, these
decisions must be directed at a specific or small group of persons,
either a legal entity or natural person. Acts and rules with a
general field of application are unlikely to form a justifiable basis
of legitimate expectations. 232 Ultra vires conduct of the
administration may, in principle, give rise to expectations deemed
to be protected; however, domestic courts' scrutiny is much higher
in relation to them than to intra vires conduct.233 Legitimate
expectations cannot arise as a result of a subjective hope. From
this perspective, domestic tribunals assess whether it is reasonable
to have such expectations in light of the overall circumstances.23 4
If the possibility of change is reasonably foreseeable, expectations
are not regarded as legitimate as maintaining the same
expectations as before. This is especially true in commercial and
economic matters, where a high degree of diligence is expected
from traders who must:
[B]e aware of the inherent uncertainties of a situation, and to be
well-informed about the possibilities of any change.

...

To

claim a legitimate expectation successfully any interference
must have occurred without warning, with immediate effect and
respect those expectations or provide compelling reasons why the public interest must
take priority. The principle therefore concerns the degree to which an individual's
expectations may be safeguarded in the face of a change of policy which tends to
undermine them.").
228 See id. at 58-62 (noting that English law draws a distinction between procedural
and substantive expectations).
229 For analysis of the domestic case law, see id. Given the large number of
domestic legal systems making use of the legitimate expectation principle, there is no
room to detail the relevant domestic caselaw on which this two-step test's introduction is
based.
230 See id.
231 See id
232 See THOMAS, supra note 227, at 41.
233 See id.
234 See id.
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without any transitional measures with a prudent trader could
have used to avoid losses.235
The second step of judicial reasoning-balancing the
legitimate expectations of the person against the particular public
and general interest that motivated the breach of the legitimate
expectations236_IS where the classic test of proportionality is
applied.23 7 If the necessity of protecting this interest outweighs the
rights of the person, determined on the basis of her legitimate
expectations, then the state measure in question is considered legal
and the person is not entitled to protection. In cases with the
opposite outcome, the protection due may--depending on the legal
system and the conduct on which legitimate expectations are
based--consist of in-kind compensation or specific performance.
2. The Distinct-Investment-BackedExpectations
Principle
To analyze the second guiding principle of interpretation
within the regime of investment law, it is necessary to trace the
domestic origin of the distinct-investment-backed expectations

Id. at 55.
See Snodgrass, supra note 129, at 46.
237 See id. Formulating the rationale of the balancing test, Snodgrass posits the
following:
235

236

The balance must in the first instance be for the policy-maker to strike; but if
the outcome is challenged by way of judicial review, I do not consider that
the court's criterion is the bare rationality of the policy-maker's conclusion.
While policy is for the policy-maker alone, the fairness of his or her decision
not to accommodate reasonable expectations which the policy will thwart
remains the court's concern (as of course does the lawfulness of the policy).
To postulate this is not to place the judge in the seat of the minister. As the
foregoing citations explain, it is the court's task to recognize the
constitutional importance of ministerial freedom to formulate and to
reformulate policy; but it is equally the court's duty to protect the interests of
those individuals whose expectations of different treatment has a legitimacy
which in fairness outtops the policy choice which threatens to frustrate it.
R. v. Ministry of Agric., Fisheries and Food, ex parte Hamble Fisheries, Ltd. (1995) 2
All E.R. 714, 724.
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principle. This principle, first introduced by Michelman,23 8 has
been developed by the U.S. Supreme Court as one of the
applicable criteria for assessing the violation of the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protecting the right to
property. 23 9 This principle help strike the balance between the
state freedom to regulate and the protection of property.2 40 In the
1978 Penn Centralcase, the Supreme Court stated:
[W]e have frequently observed that whether a particular
restriction will be rendered invalid by the government's failure
to pay for any losses proximately caused by it depends largely
upon the particular circumstances [in that] case.... In engaging
in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the Court's
decisions have identified several factors that have particular
significance. The economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct-investment-backed expectations are, of
course, relevant considerations . ... So, too, is the character of

the governmental action. 241
Ever since the Penn Central judgment, courts refer
systematically to the principle of distinct-investment-backed
expectations. 242 However, despite the frequent use of the
principle, there is an absence of consensus within American case
law as to its content, scope of application, and its specific role in
relation to other Penn Central factors.2 43 Although there is no
room here to analyze in detail the relevant U.S. case law, 24 4 it is

238 Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
FoundationsofJust Compensation Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1170 (1967).
239 See id.
240 See id
241 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
242 E.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Guggenheim v. City
of Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2011).
243 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
244 For analysis of relevant case law, see J.D. Bremer & R.S. Radford, Great
Expectations: Will Palazzolo v. Rhode Island Clarify the Murky Doctrineof InvestmentBacked Expectations in Regulatory Takings Law, 9 N.Y.U. ENvTL L.J. 449, 452 (2001);
J.D. Bremer & R.S. Radford, The (Less?) Murky Doctrine of Investment-Backed
Expectationsafter Palazzolo, and the Lower Courts' DisturbingInsistence on Wallowing
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nonetheless necessary to refer to the general trends in the
application of the distinct-investment-backed expectations
principle by U.S. courts to explain its function and content. This is
an essential step towards better understanding how this principle
should be used in the context of investment law.
a.) The Content of the Distinct-InvestmentBacked Expectations Principle
As to the content of the principle, the state of the regulatory
affairs in force at the time the owner entered into the property
plays an important role when testing the reasonableness of the
owner's expectations.2 45 Reasonableness depends on the extent to
which state law fostered and protected the expectations at the time
they were established. 246 A specific law or a normative
environment, especially in highly regulated sectors, may be
considered as giving notice to the owner that a state measure may,
hypothetically, affect her property in the future.24 7 In such a
situation, the owner may not have a distinct-investment-backed
expectation. 24 8 By the same token, no state law will support an
owner's expectation that she will be authorized to make harmful
use of her property without any intervention from the state.249
in the Pre-Palazzolo Muck, 34 Sw. U. L. REV. 351, 359 (2005) [hereinafter Bremer &
Radford, (Less?) Murky Doctrine]; D.L. Callies, Regulatory Takings and the Supreme
Court: How Perspectives on Property Rights Have Changed From Penn Central to
Dolan, and What State and Federal Courts Are Doing About It, 28 STETSON L. REV.,
523, 617 (1999); J.A. Kupiec, Returning to Principles of "Fairnessand Justice": the
Role of Investment-Backed Expectations in Total Regulatory Taking Claims, 43 B.C. L.
REV. 865, 878 (2008).
245 See Kupiec, supra note 244, at 878.
246 See id.
247 See id.

248 See Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S.
602, 645 (1993) ("Those who do business in the regulated field cannot object if the
legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative
end.") (quoting FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958)). As it may be
inferred from the case law of the Court of Federal Claims, which has repeatedly noted
that this line of reasoning is most compelling when there is no "preexisting right of use
under common law," this solution might reasonably apply when the property interest at
issue is one created by the statutory scheme itself. See, e.g., Maritrans Inc. v. United
States, 40 Fed. Cl. 790, 798 (1998).
249 See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Miller v.
Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928). As highlighted by case law and literature, at issue is the
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Recognizing the importance of notice, lower courts tend to
conceptualize and reduce the principle of distinct-investmentbacked expectations to the "notice rule:"2 50 "[A] landowner who is
on constructive notice of the existence of restrictive regulations
has no legitimate expectations to put her property to productive
use, and therefore cannot maintain a regulatory takings claim."25
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, seems reluctant to grant
such importance to the notice rule.252 The Court's current position
is consistent with the concurring opinion of Justice O'Connor in
the Palazzolo case,253 where special attention was given to the
ways through which the reasonableness of a landowner's
expectations may be assessed.25 4 In Justice O'Connor's opinion,2 5 5
distinction between "harm preventing" measures and "benefit conferring" measures. At
the core of the matter, there is the fact that as argued by the Restatement: "[P]ractically
all human activities unless carried on in a wilderness interfere to some extent with others
or involve some risk of interference." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 cmt. g
(1979) (quoted in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025 (1992)). By the
same token, Sax suggested in Takings and the Police Power that "the problem is not one
of noxiousness of harm-creating activity at all; rather it is a problem of inconsistency
between perfectly innocent and independently desirable uses." J.L. Sax, Takings and the
Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 49 (1964). From this angle, defining property as the
"end result of a process of competition among inconsistent and contending economic
values," he proposed the following rule:
When economic loss is incurred as a result of government enhancement of its
resource position in an enterprise capacity, then compensation is
constitutionally required; it is that result which is to be characterized as a taking.
But losses, however severe, incurred as a consequence of government acting
merely in its arbitral capacity are to be viewed as a non-compensable exercise of
the police power.
Id. at 63.
250 The term "notice rule" has been used by D.R. Mandelker to designate the
aforementioned doctrine. See D.R. Mandelker, Waiving the Taking Clause: Conflicting
Signalsfrom the Supreme Court, in LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 3 (1988).
251 Bremer & Radford, (Less?) Murky Doctrine, supra note 244, at 355.
252 See id at 353.

See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 603, 633-35t 378.
In fact, the majority opinion endorsed Justice O'Connor's concurrence in
Palazzolo in the 2002 Tahoe-Sierracase. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'1
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321 (2002).
255 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633-35.
253
254
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the role given by lower courts to the notice rule when determining
distinct-investment-backed expectations has to be moderated.25 6
To assess distinct-investment-backed expectations, it is also
necessary to take account of the exigencies of equal treatment and
fairness.2 57 As to equal treatment, an owner is deemed to have a
reasonable expectation to use her property in the same way as
other similarly situated owners.25 8 Concerning fairness, Justice
O'Connor leaves the door open for the identification of specific
considerations depending on the overall circumstances of the

case. 259
b.) The Significance of the DistinctInvestment-Backed Expectations
Principle
Compared to the practice preferred by a number of lower
courts in assessing the legality of a taking, Justice O'Connor
emphasized that the principle of distinct-investment-backed
expectations is just one among other factors to be considered in
assessing the legality of state measures interfering with the

[T]he state of regulatory affairs at the time of acquisition is not the only factor
that may determine the extent of investment-backed expectations. For example,
the nature and extent of permitted development under the regulatory regime visA-vis the development sought by the claimant may also shape legitimate
expectations without vesting any kind of development right in the property
owner . . . . Courts [instead] must attend to those circumstances which are

probative of what fairness requires in a given case.
Id.
256

Id. at 635-36.

257 See id. at 632-36.
258 See id. at 633-35.
259 It might include:
1) [W]hat the government told the landowner about the property before it was
purchased and how it reacted to the owner's plans during and immediately after
the land use application process; 2) whether the proposed land use is consistent
with the general zoning and planning scheme; 3) whether the projected rate of
growth for the subject locality suggests that development will be possible; 4)
whether the government allowed the landowner to take concrete steps toward
the desired use before stepping in and prohibiting it; and 5) whether the property
owner is permitted to continue an existing, profitable use of property.
Bremer & Radford, (Less?) Murky Doctrine, supra note 244, at 393.
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property of an investor. 260 Distinct-investment-backed
expectations, although important, are not talismanic under Penn
Central.2 61 The degree of interference with investment-backed
expectations is one factor considered, among others, when
evaluating whether giving effect to a particular regulation over
particular property "goes too far."262 Therefore, despite the lack of
a clear indication from the Supreme Court as to how to weigh the
Penn Central factors, there must be some balancing of the
economic impact of the measure, its fairness, and the distinctinvestment-backed expectations of the owner.26 3
The economic impact of the regulation must be measured
against the full scope of the claimant's property interest. Under
this "parcel-as-a-whole" rule, "where an owner possesses a full
'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the
bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its
entirety. 264 As for the character of the property right, it may be
seen, in light of the Tahoe-Sierra case, as a fairness test
considering whether the regulatory means are proportionate and
equitably tailored to the ends.265

260 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633-36.
261 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
262 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 634. In the Pa. Coal case, Justice Holmes admonished
that "if a regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Pa. Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 415 (1922).
263 See Bremer & Radford, (Less?) Murky Doctrine, supra note 244, at 401-02.
264 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979). As penned by Justice Brennan in
Penn Cent.:
Taking jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and
attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely
abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a
taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the
nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole.
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130-31.
265 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
321 (2002).
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c.) The Scope ofApplication of the DistinctInvestment-Backed Expectations
Principle
Another question concerning the principle of distinctinvestment-backed expectations is that of its scope of application.
Since the Lucas case, 266 despite disagreements between the
Justices267 and the on-going opposition of many lower courts, the
U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that distinct-investmentbacked expectations play a role in the partial takings of lands and
in all personal property takings (both partial and total), but not in
total takings of lands.268 For total land takings, the principle helps
to determine the relevant property interest against which the loss
of economic use is measured-a determination that will decide
whether the total or partial land's takings test applies. 26 9 However,
in the case of lands' total takings, the "background principles of
the State's law of property and nuisance" may play a role.270
Justice Scalia, who wrote for the majority of the Court in Lucas,
explained:
Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of
all economically beneficial use, we think it may resist
compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the
266
267

See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025 (1992).
In the view of Justice Kennedy:

[R]easonable expectations must be understood in light of the whole of our legal
tradition. The common law of nuisance is too narrow a confine for the exercise
of regulatory power in a complex and interdependent society . . . [t]he State
should not be prevented from enacting new regulatory initiatives in response to
changing conditions, and courts must consider all reasonable expectations
whatever their source.
Id. at 1035.
268 The concept of "total takings" refers to situations where a state deprivesthrough regulation-the property of all economically beneficial use. For a more in-depth
treatment of "total takings," see Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primerfor the
Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307, 329 (2007).
269 "The answer to this difficult question [for the relevant property interest] may lie
in how the owner's reasonable expectations have been shaped by the State's law of
property i.e., whether and to what degree the State's law has accorded legal recognition
and protection to the particular interest in land with respect to which the takings claimant
alleges a diminution in (or elimination) of value." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016.
270 Id. at 1029.
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nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use
interests were not part of his title to begin with.

. .

. [I]n the case

of personal property by reason of the State's traditionally high
degree of control over commercial dealings, [the property
owner] ought to be aware of the possibility that new regulation
might even render his property worthless (at least if the
property's only economically productive use is sale or
manufacture for sale)... . In the case of land, however, we
think the notion pressed by the Council that title is somehow
held subject to the "implied limitation" that the State may
subsequently eliminate economically valuable use is inconsistent
with the historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that
has become part of our constitutional culture.... Any limitation
so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without
compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the
restrictions that background principles of the State's law of
property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.27 1

d.) The BackgroundPrinciplesof the State's
Law ofProperty andNuisance
So as not to trigger the obligation to compensate lands' total
takings, restrictions that completely eliminate any form of
productive use of private property "must inhere in the title itself, in
the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of
property and nuisance already place upon land ownership. 2 72
Background principles are not used to balance the effect of the

measure against its purpose. Rather, they intervene upstream to
deny the existence of a property right, which therefore cannot be
affected by any type of measure after-the-fact.2 73
With regard to the "background principle of the state of law,"
271 Id. at 1027-29 (emphasis added). It may be inferred from Justice Scalia's
contention that in case of personal property's taking, no distinction has to be drawn
between partial and total takings. In both cases, the owner's legitimate expectations are
tested under the distinct-investment-backed expectations principle.
272 Id. at 1029.
273 By the same token, the U.S. Supreme Court stated in the Keystone case that
"since no individual has a right to use his property so as to create a nuisance or otherwise
harm others, the State has not 'taken' anything when it asserts its power to enjoin the
nuisance-like activity." Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470,491 (1987).
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Justice Scalia argued that it cannot be based on law "newly
legislated or decreed." 274 He also argued that "the fact that a
particular use has long been engaged in by similarly situated
owners ordinarily imports a lack of any common law prohibition"
that would absolve the government of takings liability. 275 In the
Palazzolo case, the majority opinion added that a regulation
cannot be a background principle exception merely because it
predates the owner's acquisition of title:
[It] is explained in terms of those common, shared
understandings of permissible limitations derived from a State's
legal tradition.... A regulation or common-law rule cannot be a
background principle for some owners but not for others. The
determination whether an existing, general law can limit all
economic use of property must turn on objective factors, such as
the nature of the land use proscribed.2 76
The Court went on to quote Lucas: "The 'total taking' inquiry
we require today will ordinarily entail ... analysis of, among other
things, the degree of harm to public lands and resources, or
adjacent private property, posed by the claimant's proposed
,,211
activities.
The synthesis of the previous dicta leads to the conclusion that
where a land's total taking is identified through the 'parcel as a
274
275
276
277

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
Id. at 1031.
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630 (2001).
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030-31.

On this analysis, the owner of a lake-bed, for example, would not be entitled to
compensation when he is denied the requisite permit to engage in a landfilling
operation that would have the effect of flooding others' land. Nor the corporate
owner of a nuclear generating plant, when it is directed to remove all
improvements from its land upon discovery that the plant sits astride an
earthquake fault. Such regulatory action may well have the effect of eliminating
the land's only economically productive use, but it does not proscribe a
productive use that was previously permissible under relevant property and
nuisance principles. The use of these properties for what are now expressly
prohibited purposes was always unlawful, and (subject to other constitutional
limitations) it was open to the State at any point to make the implication of
those background principles of nuisance and property law explicit.
Id. at 1029-30.
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whole' rule, the assessment of the owner's distinct-investmentbacked expectations is not needed. 278 In that case, only
background principles of domestic legislation on property and
nuisance may come into play to deny the existence of a property
right.279 The background principles of domestic legislation on
property and nuisance can be identified especially through two
criteria: (1) equal treatment of all owners that find themselves in a
similar situation with regard to the relevant common law; and (2)
the relevant objective elements surrounding the particular
circumstances of a case, such as the harm caused to the general

interest. 280
e.) Synthesis
This analysis leads to the conclusion that, given the subtleties
and intricacies of U.S. case law, knowledge of principle is needed
to contextualize the way U.S. landowners' expectations are
assessed in relation to all the elements taken into account in U.S.
practice. Focusing on the case law of the Supreme Court, the main
conclusions that may be reached are twofold, concerning the
The distinctscenarios of both partial and total takings.
investment-backed expectations principle plays a role to determine
the relevant property interests against which the loss of economic
use has to be measured. This determination in turn decides
whether the total or partial takings test applies.28 1
In the case of partial takings of both personal and land
property, a balance must be struck between the three Penn Central
factors to assess whether the measure at stake is confiscatory (1)
economic impact: (2) character of the measure, and (3) distinctinvestment backed expectations.2 82 As for the third criterion, the
state of regulatory affairs, as it is broadly understood, is one of the
main criteria used to evaluate distinct-investment-backed
Beyond this normative element, nonexpectations. 283

278
279
280
281

See id at 1034.
Id. at 1031.
See id. at 1029-32.
See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); Lucas, 505 U.S.

1003.
282
283

See Penn Cent. Transport Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
See, e.g., Bremer & Radford, (Less?) Murky Doctrine, supra note 244, at 491.
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discrimination and fairness will also inform owners'
expectations. 284 To evaluate fairness, the Court assesses the
overall circumstances. As to the equal treatment of owners in
similar situations is considered.
In the case of a total taking of personal property, due to the
State's traditionally high degree of control in commercial dealings,
the distinct-investment-backed expectations principle applies. 285 It
does not apply, however, in relation to a total taking of land
property. 286 Instead, the "background principles" of domestic
legislation on property and "nuisance" may prohibit the particular
use of the property at stake. 287 The objective elements of the case,
as well as the way all owners in similar situations are treated help
to ascertain the existence of such common law rules.288
3. The Connection between the Legitimate
ExpectationPrinciple and the DistinctInvestment-Backed Expectations Principle
Finally, it is of interest to analyze the way the legitimate
and the distinct-investment-backed
expectation principle
expectations principle are connected in both conceptual and
technical ways. From a conceptual perspective, both principles
aim to strike a balance between the state's normative freedom and
the protection of the person.289 in a way, the distinct-investmentbacked expectations principle has a narrower scope of application
than the legitimate expectation principle, in that it only protects
owners.2 90 Underlying their common aim is fairness.29 1 In both
cases, these principles attempt to assess-in light of the overall
a person acted with legitimate
circumstances-whether

See, e.g., id.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-28.
286 See, e.g. id. at 1029-30.
287 Id. at 1029.
288 See id.
289 See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 634 (2001); Bremer &
Radford, (Less?) Murky Doctrine,supra note 244, 516-22.
290 Bremer & Radford, (Less?) Murky Doctrine, supra note 244, at 454; Kupiec,
supra note 244, at 885.
291 See Bremer & Radford, (Less?) Murky Doctrine,supra note 244, at 454.
284
285
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expectations.2 92
From a technical perspective, the main difference lies in the
basis of the expectations.2 93 Under the legitimate expectation
principle, expectations are tested only when a special commitment
or representation exists, the legitimacy of which is then assessed in
Under the distinctlight of the overall circumstances. 294
investment-backed expectations principle, expectations are
assessed in light of the state of the regulatory affair as a whole, as
well as the overall circumstances.29 5
At this point, the question arises whether the legitimate
expectation principle plays a role in this second test. As a matter
of principle, it seems that if an owner was granted a specific
commitment or representation, it may be considered as a relevant
circumstance when assessing the frustration of distinctinvestment-backed expectations.
Equipped with this domestic law toolbox, it is now possible to
describe the way the legitimate expectation principle and the
distinct-investment-backed expectations principle may help to
assess the legality of human rights measures, in the context of
international investment arbitration.
B. Assessing The Legality ofHuman Rights State Measures
It is useful to recall the special "ethos" of investment law, and
to emphasize that the way the principles of legitimate expectations
and of distinct-investment-backed expectations are used in the
context of investment law is conditioned by that very ethos. 296 The
analysis that follows tests the validity of this article's hypothesis,
which proposes that by applying the two guiding principles of
interpretation, arbitral tribunals will only rarely conclude that a
human rights state measure violates the FET and the prohibition of
indirect expropriation. If this hypothesis is correct, then one may

See id. at 358-59; see, e.g., Kupiec, supra note 244.
See Bremer & Radford, (Less?) Murky Doctrine, supra note 244, at 357-58.
294 See id.
295 See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633-35; see also Kupiec,
supra note 244 at 865-68.
296 See generally Reinisch, supra note 154, at 183 (describing how ethos of
investment law can be a schizophrenic one, both used to protect the interests of the local
population and those of the investors).
292

293
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safely conclude that, indeed, the regime of investment law is
flexible enough to permit regulation at the domestic level in favor
of human rights without the host state necessarily being in breach
of its obligations vis-A-vis the investor.29 7
1. The Fairand Equitable Treatment Provision
There is no precise definition of the FET. 2 98 Although the
general meaning given to that term is the host state's duty to treat
investors fairly and equitably, the exact meaning of the obligation
is substantially vague and, therefore, open to interpretation. 299 The
relevant case law of arbitral tribunals offers a number of elements,
which can be analysed in the following five categories: (a)
obligation of vigilance and protection; (b) due process, including
non-denial of justice and lack of arbitrariness; (c) transparency; (d)
good faith (which includes both transparency and lack of
arbitrariness); and (e) autonomous elements of fairness.30 0 The
only safe conclusion that can be drawn from this general
categorization is that the FET provision has a wide scope of
application.30 1
Given the difficulties in domesticating the FET provision, this
paper will proceed by briefly discussing in section (a) the
components of the concept which are the most relevant to the
question examined therein. Then, in the light of this framework,
the article will focus on the function of the principle of legitimate
expectations within the framework of the FET and will seek to
demonstrate that its application generally allows us to conclude
that human rights state measures are unlikely to result in a breach
of the FET provision.

See generally Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030-31 (1992).
See Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Development (OECD), Fairand Equitable
Treatment Standard in InternationalInvestment Law 1 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation and
Dev.,Working Papers on International Investment No. 2004/3, 2004).
299 See id.
300 See id.
301 As noted by Dolzer and Schreuer, "[i]n its diverse manifestations, the standard
of fair and equitable treatment may address a variety of governmental actions that affect
investments and which more specific rules are unsuitable to address." DOLZER &
SCHREUER, supra note 136, at 176.
297
298
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a. The Relevant Normative Background
To assess the relevant normative framework, we must first
delineate the situation at stake. An investor may claim that a nondiscriminatory measure enacted to protect human rights constitutes
an unfair or inequitable treatment, because she sees that measure
as infringing on the normative framework regulating her
activity.302 Such a situation is factually linked to the following
question: Does a host state generally have the right to modify the
normative framework that regulates the activity of investors?
Given the terseness of conventional practice, it is useful to begin
by examining the relevant arbitral decision.
In the CMS case, the arbitral tribunal contended that "[t]he
[BIT's] Preamble makes it clear, however that one principal
objective of the protection envisaged is that fair and equitable
treatment is desirable 'to maintain a stable framework for
investments and maximum effective use of economic
resources."' 3 03 With necessary modifications, a similar conclusion
may be inferred from the preamble of most investment
agreements.304
One then has to determine the requirements of stabilityespecially with regard to the normative expectations. To answer
this question, it is appropriate to start with the statement made by
the Tecmed arbitral tribunal regarding the "basic expectations" of
an investor when making an investment. 305 This example
constitutes the most developed obiter dictum on the issue.
The foreign investor expects the host State to act in a consistent
manner, free from ambiguity, and totally transparent in its
relations with the foreign investor. Knowing beforehand any

See id at 134.
303 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
12,
2005),
available at
Final
Award,
80
(May
ARB/01/08,
http://icsid.worldbank.orgfACSIDIFrontServiet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=show
Doc&docld=DC504 En&caseld=C4.
304 See id. 274.
305 See T6cnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award,
154 (May 29, 2003), available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServiet?requestTypes=casesRH&actionvai
=showDoc&docld=DC602 En&caseld=cl86.
302
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and all rules and regulations that will govern its investments, as
well as the goals of the relevant policies and administrative
practices or directives, the investor is able to plan her investment
and comply with such regulations. Any and all State actions
conforming to such criteria should relate not only to the
guidelines, directives or requirements issued, or the resolutions
approved thereunder, but also to the goals underlying such
regulations. The foreign investor also expects the host State to
act consistently-without arbitrarily revoking any pre-existing
decisions or permits issued by the State that were relied upon by
the investor to assume its commitments and to plan and launch
its commercial and business activities. The investor also expects
the State to use the legal instruments governing the actions of
the investor or the investment in conformity with the function
usually assigned to such instruments and not to deprive the
306
investor of her investment without the required compensation.
Two main conclusions can be inferred from this obiter dictum.
First, based on the requirement that investors know all of the
relevant rules and regulations beforehand, it may be concluded
that investors can expect the regulatory framework to be frozen at
the time they made their investment.30 7 Secondly, it may be
deduced that a state cannot arbitrarily revoke a special
commitment entered into with an investor.30 8
It is generally accepted that investors' expectations are
grounded in the legal order of the host state as it stands at the time
when the investor acquires the investment.3 09 However, it is less
clear whether both stability and transparency 310 require the
freezing of the regulatory framework. Such a conclusion would
indeed contravene the fundamental principle of domestic legal
orders from which states enjoy their normative freedom.3 l If an

306 See T6cnicas Medioambientales Teemed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, 1154 (May 29, 2003).
307 See id T 186.
308 See id. 1 77-200.
309 See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 136, at 134.
310 See id. at 133-34. "Transparency means that the legal framework for the
investor's operations is readily apparent and that any decisions affecting the investor can
be traced to that legal framework." Id.
311 See, e.g., id. at 134-35.
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investor could always successfully bring the host state before an
arbitration tribunal for the modification of the normative
framework that regulates her activity, the normative freedom of
the state would be paralyzed.3 12 However, a state may alwayswhile making use of its normative power-commit to freeze the
applicable law with regard to a specific investor.3 13
In light of these two remarks, this paper suggests that the
assessment of the legality of state measures that affect the legal
framework surrounding the activities of investors may only be
realized through the principle of legitimate expectations, on the
basis of the aforementioned two-step test that this principle
introduces.3 14 First, an arbitral tribunal will be expected to assess
whether the investor has been granted a specific commitment,
aiming to freeze the normative framework that regulates her
activity.3 1 5 In cases where such a commitment exists and has been
legitimately relied upon, the legitimate expectations of the
investor, flowing from the commitment, have to be balanced
against the public and general interest pursued by the relevant
measure infringing such commitment. If the state measure is
judged to be proportionate, modification of the normative
framework is considered not to violate the FET provision.3 16 If, on
the other hand, the relevant state measure fails to pass the test of
proportionality, then the FET provision is considered breached and

312 See Leben, La libertdsupra note 205, at 180.
313 In that sense, the Parkerings-CompagnietTribunal stated that:
It is each State's undeniable right and privilege to exercise its sovereign
legislative power. A State has the right to enact, modify or cancel a law at its
own discretion. Save for the existence of an agreement, in the form of a
stabilization clause or otherwise, there is nothing objectionable about the
amendment brought to the regulatory framework existing at the time an investor
made its investment.
Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lith., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/08, Award, T
at
2007),
available
(Sept.
11,
332
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=show
Doc&docld=DC682 En&caseld=C252.
314 See generallyTHOMAS, supra note 227 (explaining the "two-step" test).
315 But see CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/08, Final Award, 198.
316 See, e.g., Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Development (OECD), supra note
298.
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the host state is liable. 1
The aforementioned reasoning is validated by part of the
arbitration practice."' The CMS tribunal adopted a more nuanced
approach with regard to the criteria of stability and predictability
than the Tecmed tribunal.3 19 Indeed, the Tribunal suggested that:
[I]t is not a question of whether the legal framework might need
to be frozen as it can always evolve and be adapted to changing
circumstances, but neither is it a question of whether the
framework can be dispensed with altogether when specific
commitments to the contrary have been made. 32 0
In the same manner, the EDF tribunal contended that:
The idea that legitimate expectations, and therefore FET, imply
the stability of the legal and business framework, may not be
correct if stated in an overly-broad and unqualified formulation.
The FET might then mean the virtual freezing of the legal
regulation of economic activities, in contrast with the State's
normal regulatory power and the evolutionary character of
economic life.
Except where specific promises or
representations are made by the State to the investor, the latter
may not rely on a bilateral investment treaty as a kind of
insurance policy against the risk of any changes in the host
State's legal and economic framework. Such expectation would
be neither legitimate nor reasonable. 32 1

See, e.g., id.
318 See, e.g., CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/08, Final Award, 80; EDF (Serv.) Ltd. v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13,
Award,
217
(Oct.
8,
2009),
available
at
http://italaw.com/documents/EDFAwardandDissent.pdf; Saluka Inv. BV (Neth.) v. The
Czech Republic, Partial Award, 1 306 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006), available at
http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/SAL-CZ%20Partial%20Award%20170306.pdf..
319 See CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/08,
Final
Award,
80,
available
at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServiet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=show
Doc&docld=DC504_En&caseld=C4.; EDF (Serv.) Ltd. v. Rom., ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/13, Award, T 217.
320 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/08, Final Award, 277.
321 EDF (Serv.) Ltd. v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Award, 217.
317
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However, the Saluka tribunal concluded that the breach of a
special commitment does not automatically entail the violation of
the FET provision.2 Such a finding "requires a weighing of the
Claimant's legitimate and reasonable expectations on the one hand
and the Respondent's legitimate regulatory interests on the
other."323 Proceeding with this kind of weighing, arbitrators must
assess whether the breach of legitimate expectations was necessary
for the achievement of the public and general interest objective.3 24
This requires taking into account all the relevant circumstances of
the case, as well as the availability to the host state of alternative
measures that would equally protect the public and general interest
without harming the interests of the investor.325
These preliminary conclusions allow assessment of the
circumstances under which a state measure enacted to protect
human rights may breach the FET provision.
b. Assessment of the Legality ofHuman Rights: State
Measures
In order to better explain the reasoning that follows, it is
necessary to recall the factual situation at stake. An investor
considers that a non-discriminatory measure enacted by the host
state pursuant to a human rights objective affects the normative
framework regulating her activity and, therefore, breaches her
rights under the FET provision.3 26
For the purposes of this analysis, it is useful to distinguish
between two possible normative scenarios.3 27 As to the first one,
the breach of the FET provision is tested against a normative
framework that regulates an entire sector of economic activity, and
322 See Saluka Investments BV (Neth.) v. Czech Republic, Partial Award,
500
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006).
323 Id. at 306.
324 See id. at 307.
325 For examples of how such weighing is used in the European Court of Justice,
see Case 112/80, Firma Anton Dirbeck v. Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main-Flughafen,
1981 E.C.R. 1095; Case C-189/89, Spagl v. Hauptzollamt Rosenheim, 1990 E.C.R. I4539; and THOMAS, supra note 227, at 68.
326 See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 136, at 123.
327 See id. at 130-32. (contending that these two normative frameworks may
nevertheless overlap).
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not specifically the activities of one particular investor. 32 8 The
second scenario refers to domestic norms aiming to regulate the
activities of a particular foreign investor-for instance through an
authorization, a licence, or a permit. 329 The aim under both
scenarios is to determine under which conditions the modification
of the normative framework breaches the FET.
Starting then with the first scenario, it has been explained that
states enjoy a normative freedom. In this context, they may, in
principle, freely regulate a sector of activity since the regulation is
applicable to all investors who are active in that sector.330 An
investor cannot expect the new regulation to not apply to her. 3 '
The general normative framework that regulates her activity is not
frozen at the time she makes her investment.33 2 Such a freeze can
only occur if the state has made a specific commitment that new
regulations will not apply to her.333 Such a specific commitment
would create the legitimate expectation that the normative
framework regulating her activity is not modified.33 4
As far as the second scenario is concerned (i.e., the norms
regulating the activities of a particular foreign investor), these
norms constitute the basis of the legitimate expectations of the
investor concerned. More specifically, they constitute the basis of
two different legitimate expectations: the expectation to exercise
the activity she was authorized to develop and the expectation to
do so under the conditions decided by the state or agreed upon by
the investor herself.335
As a guide to determine whether the FET provision has been
breached, arbitrators must first identify whether legitimate
expectations for the investor were created by the state.
See id. at 144-46.
See id. at 147.
330 See, e.g., id.
331 See, e.g., DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 136, at 134.
332 See Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lith., ICSID Case No.
at
11,
2007),
available
Award,
T
332
(Sept.
ARB/05/08,
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServiet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=show
Doc&docld=DC682_En&caseld=C252.
333 See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 136, at 134.
334 See id.
335 See id. at 144.
336 See id at 134.
328
329
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However, an arbitration tribunal cannot definitively conclude that
a modification of the normative framework, breaching the
legitimate expectations, equally violates the FET provision, unless
it first applies the test of proportionality. "' Assessing the
infringement of investors' legitimate expectations constitutes only
In the framework of
the first step of the reasoning.
proportionality, arbitrators must also balance the legitimate
expectations of the investor against the human rights objective
pursued by the state measure in question.33 8 To do so, arbitrators
must assess whether the measure was necessary in light of the
circumstances of the case and whether alternative means for
reaching the same public and general interest goal were available
to the host state.
As far as the circumstances of the case are concerned, though
reality is often difficult to conceptualize, two general categories
may be envisaged. The first relates to the future planned human
rights policies of the state; the second is linked to an unforeseeable
situation calling for a state reaction."' Concerning the former,
what may generally be argued is that long-term promotion of
human rights will rarely justify the infringement of the investor's
legitimate expectations.34 0 This is so because the promotion of
human rights is an on-going process towards a middle/long-term
objective. 341 States are free to plan the way they choose to
promote human rights.3 42
The absence of urgency leaves both room and time to adapt
domestic policy to the expectations of investors. When a state
creates legitimate expectations with regard to the regulatory
framework, it knows--or at least is expected to know-the human
rights consequences of that specific economic or investment
policy.343
However, in an unpredictable context, when a state enacts

337 See id at 112.
338 See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 136, at 175-76 (describing the relationship
of arbitration to the FET).
339 See id. at 128-230.
340 See id at 164.
341 See id
342 See id
343 See Id
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measures to protect human rights in a situation threatening their
enjoyment by local society, the circumstances are totally
different." The state must act with urgency.34 5 It is unable to
foresee the necessity of enacting special measures to safeguard
human rights.3 46
For instance, after a state licence for the production of a
medicine has been granted, science may reveal that the product is
life-threatening. Then, there is no alternative for the state other
than to ban the production of the medicine. In the same vein, if
scientific research concludes that a chemical product is dangerous
for the environment, what can the state do other than to ban its
production? In such cases, the circumstances surrounding the
conflict between the investor's and the state's interests and the
absence of any other available means for protecting human rights
justify, in principle, the infringement of investor's legitimate
expectations. This justification, in turn, legalizes the relevant state
practice as necessary to protect the public and general interest.
Thus, it passes the test of proportionality. The balance of interests,
which could through systemic integration be easily elevated in a
conflict between norms, is inherent to the principle of legitimate
expectations, which itself allows the legitimate limitation of the
expectations of an investor under the FET.347
In light of the above, one may conclude that an arbitral
tribunal, guided by the principle of legitimate expectations, will
only rarely judge that a human rights state measure breaches the
FET provision. However, no matter how legitimate the human
rights purposes pursued by state policy are, the state will be
considered responsible for the breach of its obligations towards an
investor acting in good faith if it gave promises it knew-or
should have known-it could not harmonize with its human rights
obligations or policies.348
2. The Indirect ExpropriationProvision
The second right of the investor, tested with regard to its
344

See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 136, at 164.

345 See id at 166-67.
346

See id at 167.

347 See idat 133-35.
348

See id at 134.
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flexibility to human rights policy, is the right not to be directly and
indirectly expropriated. 34 In terms of conventional practice,
indirect expropriation occurs when the relevant state practice
interfering with the right to property of the investor has the same
effect as direct expropriation.
Faced with such an unclear
definition,35 0 arbitral case law appears rather fragmented," as to
the criteria of indirect expropriation.35 2 To date, several different
tests have been suggested for determining the existence of indirect
expropriation.5 The key criteria, whose use vary from one test to
the other, are as follows: (1) the weight given to the effect a state
measure may have on the property of the investor; and (2) the
objective pursued by such a measure.3 54
However, despite the absence of consensus as to the conditions
amounting to an indirect expropriation, the conditions of legality
of both direct and indirect expropriation are well establishedboth in customary law and in investment agreements. " An
indirect expropriation is considered to be legal under the following
circumstances: (1) it aims to protect public and general interest;
(2) it is done in conformity with the law; (3) it is done in a nondiscriminatory way; and, finally, (4) it is compensated.35 6 If these
conditions are not met, the expropriation is illegal and violates the
investment agreement. 357 The state is thereby obligated to

349 See Catherine Yannaca-Small, Indirect Expropriation And The Right To
Regulate In International Investment Law 3 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev.,
Working Papers on International Investment No. 2004/4, 2004). In light of the topic here
dealt with, the situations of direct expropriation will not be analyzed in this part.
Furthermore, no distinction will be made between indirect and creeping expropriation.
350 See id at 3. The aforementioned Annex B,
(4)(a) of the U.S. Model BIT
constitutes an exception.
351 See id. at 3-4.
352 See id at 21.
353 See Yannaca-Small, supra note 349, at 18.
354 See idat 18.
355 See id.at 3-4. The conditions mentioned here constitute the core of the
conditions provided in investment agreements. However, additional conditions may be
added in a few treaties. Considering the issues covered in this chapter, no account will
be taken of these conventional specificities.
Whatever these peculiarities, the
conclusions reached are also applicable in the ambit of these treaty provisions.
356 See id at 7.
357 See Yannaca-Small, supranote 349, at 6-7.
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compensate the investor for the loss she has suffered. 35
Interestingly, compensation in the case of expropriation is both a
condition of legality of the expropriation and a means for the
reparation of its violation.35
In addition to the previous questions, there is a third issue
concerning the distinction between expropriation and regulation.3 60
It is sometimes suggested that non-discriminatory regulatory
measures, no matter their effect, do not constitute an indirect
expropriation; and, therefore, the regulations are legal without
compensation to be owed. 361
The distinction between
expropriation and regulation reflects the idea that these two
concepts obey different criteria of identification. The difference is
deemed to arise from the regulatory purpose of the measure.3 62 A
state's human rights measures fall into this category of regulatory
measures. 363 They involve the regulation of a general field of
activity or are focused on a specific investor.364 Hence, the focus
of this article cannot be different than regulatory measures.
Given the silence of investment agreements in this regard, as
well as the inconsistencies in the case law of arbitral tribunals,3 65 it
is useful to present the tests that have been applied in order to
conclude whether a regulatory measure enacted by the host state
amounts to an indirect expropriation. Accordingly, this paper will
discuss the following three methods: (1) the "sole effect" doctrine,
focusing on the effect of such measure on investment; (2) the
"police power" doctrine, based on the objective pursued by the

See id at 8.
359 See Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res.
56/83(1), U.N. Doc. A/56/49, at 9 (Dec. 12, 2001).
360 See Yannaca-Small, supra note 349, at 9-10.
361 See id.at 4-5.
358

362

See id at 15.

See id.at 11.
See id.at 8.
365 See Yannaca-Small, supra note 349, at 3. In this respect, the U.S. Model BIT
constitutes an exception. Following Annex B, $ (4)(b), "except in rare circumstances,
non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect
legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment,
do not constitute indirect expropriations." Treaty Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of [Country] Concerning the Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, supra note 223, at Annex B, (4)(b).
363

364
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measure in question; and (3) the "proportionality test" doctrine
which reconciles the two previous tests by balancing the objective
pursued by the state measure with the effect this measure has on
investment. In doing so, this paper will demonstrate that beyond
the dogma of obiter dicta, tribunals tend to apply, at least
implicitly, a proportionality test that comes close to the
aforementioned reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court.
As a result, Part III.B.2.a. argues that the interpretative tools
created by the Supreme Court help to clarify and further develop
the approach of investment arbitration tribunals to the issue of
indirect expropriation. On this basis, analysis will then turn
towards the legality of human rights state measures with regard to
the prohibition of indirect expropriation. Once again, consistent
with its premises, this article will demonstrate that by using the
available mechanisms of interpretation developed by the U.S.
Supreme Court, arbitration tribunals will rarely come to the
conclusion that a non-compensated measure pursuing a human
rights objective is in breach of the provision on indirect
expropriation in Part III.B.2.b.
a. Methods for Concluding Whether Regulatory
Measures Amount to Indirect Expropriation
Under the sole effect doctrine, arbitration tribunals only
explicitly take account of the effect of the measure. 367 This
doctrine is applied in three different ways.36 8
Following the first one-the most favourable to the investora state measure amounts to an expropriation if it affects
significantly the value of the investment. As an example, the
Metalcladtribunal stated that:
Thus, expropriation under NAFTA includes not only open,
deliberate and acknowledged takings of property, such as
outright seizure or formal or obligatory transfer of title in favour
of the host State, but also covert or incidental interference with
the use of property which has the effect of depriving the owner,
366
367
368

See Yannaca-Small, supra note 349 at 18, 22.
See id. at 15.
See CHRISTOPHER DUGAN, NOAH D. RUBINs, DON WALLACE &

INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION

450 (2008).
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in whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-beexpected economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to
the obvious benefit of the host State. 36 9
Per the second, a state measure is considered to amount to an
expropriation if it deprives the investor of control of her
investment. In that sense and referring to the Pope and Talbot
case, 37 0 the Feldman tribunal contended that:
[H]ere, as in Pope & Talbot, the regulatory action (enforcement
of longstanding provisions of Mexican law) has not deprived the
Claimant of control of the investment, CEMSA, interfered
directly in the internal operations of CEMSA or displaced the
Claimant as the controlling shareholder. The Claimant is free to
pursue other continuing lines of export trading, such as
exporting alcoholic beverages, photographic supplies, or other
products for which he can obtain from Mexico the invoices
required under Article 4, although he is effectively precluded
from exporting cigarettes. Thus, this Tribunal believes there has
been no "taking" under this standard articulated in Pope &
Talbot, in the present case. 371
Finally, the third trend in the application of the sole effect
doctrine bases its reasoning on the destruction of the value of the
investment, with no regard for the degree of control left to the
investor.372 Following that trend, the Tecmed tribunal declared
that:
To establish whether the Resolution is a measure equivalent to
an expropriation under the terms of Section 5(1) of the
Agreement, it must be first determined if the Claimant, due to
369 Metalclad Corp.v. Mex., ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1, Award, T 130, (Aug.
30,
2000),
available
at
http://naftaciaims.com/Disputes/MexicoMetalcladFinalAward.pdf.
370 Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Government of Can., NAFTA Arb. Trib., Final Awards,
100 (Nov. 26, 2002).
371 Feldman v. Mex., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award on Merits, 1 112
(Dec. 16, 2002), available at http://italaw.com/documents/feldman-mexico-awardenglish.pdf
372 See Yannaca-Small, supra note 349, at 12.
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the Resolution, was radically deprived of the economical use
and enjoyment of its investments, as if the rights related
thereto-such as the income or benefits related to the Landfill or
to its exploitation-had ceased to exist. In other words, if due to
the actions of the Respondent, the assets involved have lost their
value or economic use for their holder and the extent of the loss.
Those assets and rights of any real substance. Upon determining
the degree to which the investor is deprived of its goods or
rights, whether such deprivation should be compensated and
whether it amounts or not to a de facto expropriation is also
determined. Thus, the effects of the actions or behaviour under
analysis are not irrelevant to determine whether the action or
behaviour is an expropriation.373
Beyond the dogma of obiter dicta, the second and third
approaches of the sole effect doctrine do not appear to be more
protective of investors than the most balanced and used version of
the police power doctrine. Under this version and beyond the
rigoristic trend illustrated by the Methanex award, 3' a state
measure pursuing the realisation of public and general interest that
affects the investment does not amount to an expropriation except
in extreme situations. Thus, in the EnCana case, the arbitration
tribunal stated that:
In the absence of a specific commitment from the host State, the
foreign investor has neither the right nor any legitimate
expectation that the tax regime will not change, perhaps to its
disadvantage, during the period of the investment. Of its nature
all taxations reduce the economic benefits an enterprise would
otherwise derive from the investment; it will only be in an
extreme case that a tax which is general in its incidence could be
judged as equivalent in its effect to an expropriation of the
enterprise which is taxed.375

373 Thcnicas Medioambientales Teemed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, 1 115 (May 29, 2003), available at
http://italaw.com/documents/Tecnicas_011 .pdf.
374 See Methanex v. United States, NAFTA Arb. Trib., Final Award, 1 7 (Aug. 3,
2005).
375 EnCana Corp. (Can.) v. Republic of Ecuador, London Court of International
Arbitration, Case No. UN3481, Awards, 169 (Feb. 3, 2006).
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From the perspective of the police power doctrine, this
solution seems similar to the one reached by arbitration tribunals
in the aforementioned Feldman and Tecmed cases: a state measure
pursuing the public and general interest amounts to an
expropriation only in extreme situations-the loss of control or
complete destruction of the investment's value."'
Beyond the dogma of doctrines, this test can be conceptualized
as a technique of interpretation that strikes a balance between
public and general interests and the interests of the investor. In
practice, the investor bears the brunt of satisfying public and
general interest to the point of annihilating his investment.3" At
that point, society assumes the consequences of such
satisfaction.
In addition to being at the core of the aforementioned case law,
376

In that sense, the Feldman tribunal made it clear that:

[N]ot all government regulatory activity that makes it difficult or impossible for
an investor to carry out a particular business, change in the law or change in the
application of existing laws that makes it uneconomical to continue a particular
business, is an expropriation under Article 1110. Governments, in their exercise
of regulatory power, frequently change their laws and regulations in response to
changing economic circumstances or changing political, economic or social
considerations. Those changes may well make certain activities less profitable
or even uneconomic to continue.
Feldman v. Mex., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award on Merits, 112 (Dec. 16,
2002), available at http://italaw.com/documents/feldman mexico-award-english.pdf.
37 See Yannaca-Small, supra note 349, at 18-19.
378 Following this approach, the aforementioned distinction between regulation and
expropriation can be discussed. As asked by Judge Higgins: "Is not the State in both
cases (that is, either by a taking for a public purpose, or by regulating) purporting to act
in the common good. And in each case has the owner of the property not suffered loss?"
Id In fact, the author shares the view expressed by Judge Higgins, arguing that the
difference between expropriation and regulation based on public purpose is hardly viable
intellectually. In this regard, the conclusions reached by Judge Higgins in the context of
international law are equally pertinent also for investment law: "A regulation that
amounted (by virtue of its scope and effect) to a taking, would need to be 'for a public
purpose' (in the sense of in general, rather than for a private, interest). And just
compensation would be due. At the same time interferences with property for economic
and financial regulatory purposes are tolerated to a significant extent." Rosalyn Higgins,
The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in InternationalLaw, in 3
RECUEIL DES COURS 259, 331 (1982).
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this technique of interpretation is explicit in the test of
proportionality used by some arbitration tribunals.3 79 A detailed
description of this test can be found in the Tecmed case:
After establishing that regulatory actions and measures will not
be initially excluded from the definition of expropriatory acts, in
addition to the negative financial impact of such actions or
measures, the Arbitral Tribunal will consider, in order to
determine if they are to be characterized as expropriatory,
whether such actions or measures are proportional to the public
interest presumably protected thereby and to the protection
legally granted to investments, taking into account that the
significance of such impact has a key role upon deciding the
Although the analysis starts at the due
proportionality.
deference owing to the State when defining the issues that affect
its public policy or the interests of society as a whole, as well as
the actions that will be implemented to protect such values, such
situation does not prevent the Arbitral Tribunal ... from
examining the actions of the State ... to determine whether such
measures are reasonable with respect to their goals, the
deprivation of economic rights and the legitimate expectations
of who suffered such deprivation. There must be a reasonable
relationship of proportionality between the charge or weight
imposed to the foreign investor and the aim sought to be realized
by any expropriatory measure. To value such charge or weight,
it is very important to measure the size of the ownership
deprivation caused by the action of the state and whether such
deprivation was compensated or not... it should be also
considered that the foreign investor has a reduced or nil
participation in the taking of the decisions that affect it. 380
Under the proportionality test, arbitrators take into account the
objectives pursued by the measure, its effect, and the legitimate
expectations of the investor."' In this sense, it appears to be very

See Yannaca-Small, supranote 349, at 18.
T6cnicas Medioambientales Teemed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ij 122 (May 29, 2003), available at
http://italaw.com/documents/Tecnicas_011 .pdf.
381 See Yannaca-Small, supranote 349, at 21.
379
380
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similar to the test mentioned in the U.S. BIT model38 2 and applied
by the U.S. Supreme Court in relation to takings. Given this
similarity, the proportionality test needs to be elaborated further in
arbitration practice.3 83 It is on the basis of the aforementioned U.S.
Supreme Court reasoning that, this paper demonstrates that a
noncompensated and nondiscriminatory human rights measureenacted in good faith and in conformity with the law-will rarely
be in breach of the provision on indirect expropriation.
b. Assessment of the Legality ofHuman Rights State
Measures
The question is here considered when a state measure has the
effect of fully depriving the investor of her investment.34 From
this perspective and per U.S. Supreme Court caselaw, this section
will follow the legal reasoning of this Court concerning takings.38 5
Therefore, with regard to personal property, the expectations of
investors must be assessed especially on the basis of the distinctinvestment-backed expectations principle. As for land property,
the assessment must be made on the basis of the principles which,
in the context of the law applicable to investment arbitration,
amount to the "background principles of the State's law of
property and nuisance" of the United States.3 86

See id. at 3.
See id. at 22.
384 See id at 15. The focus is put on total taking cases and not on partial takings.
This focus is justified by the fact that mainstream arbitration practice considers that
partial deprivations are not constitutive of an indirect expropriation.
385 See id. at 10-15.
386 Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of [Country] Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment, supra note 223, 1 177. This recourse. to the "total taking reasoning"
developed by the U.S. Supreme Court in relation to lands takings is led by respect for the
judicial body's hierarchy in the United States. However, it can be noted that the use of
the distinct-investment-backed expectations principle in this situation would reinforce
the conclusions reached in this paper. This is so because this principle enlarges the
scope of the laws-not only the background principles-which can have the effect,
under the condition of an equal treatment of owners, to limit owner's expectations.
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court case law tends to highlight the application which
can be made of the aforementioned Annex B of the 2004 US BIT Model. In case of total
takings, the reference it makes to the distinct-investment-backed expectations tends to
put the focus on the background principles. See Yannaca-Small, supra note 349, at 3
382

383
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Starting with the personal property of the investor, one should
first recall the elements referred to by the U.S. Supreme Court
when assessing the takings of such property:3 87 (1) the effect of the
measure; (2) its character; and (3) the distinct-investment-backed
expectations of the owner. 3 88 The effect of the measure is assessed
against the full scope of the claimant's property interest. As for
character, the Supreme Court considers whether the regulatory
means are proportionate and equitably tailored to the ends.389
Lastly, the distinct-investment-backed expectations of the owner
are assessed with regard to: (a) the notice rule (the state of the
regulatory affair in force at the time the person entered into her
property); (b) the use of personal property by owners in a similar
situation; and (c) specific considerations connected to the overall
circumstances of the case.390
In the framework of a bona fide state measure which pursues a
human rights objective and which, de facto, fully deprives an
investor of her property, the distinct-investment-backed
expectations principle is the key factor. As for non-discrimination,
in the framework of this scenario, all investors in the same
situation will be treated equally. Turning to the notice rule, given
that human rights norms have been in force since the aftermath of
World War II and that investors typically develop an activity in a
highly regulated sector, it can be considered that this "human
rights normative environment" gives investors notice that a state
measure may be enacted which would affect their investment.3 9 '
Lastly, in relation to fairness and the overall circumstances
surrounding the case, the existence of a specific commitment or
representation may affect the outcome of the test.
In fact, what comes into play here is the legitimate
387 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
388 See id.
389 See id. at 124.
390 See id. at 124.

391 See Yannaca-Small, supra note 349, at 18. Nevertheless, one may consider that
under the "character factor" and in relation to the aforementioned analysis of the
proportionality test, a state measure enacted for the promotion of a long-term human
rights objective and which has the effect of fully depriving an investor of its investment
will not pass the Penn Central test. On the contrary, it will do so in the cases-the most
frequent ones in arbitration practice-where the state measure is enacted to protect a
human rights interest in an unforeseeable situation.
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expectations created for the investor by a special commitment of
the state, promising not to modify the regulatory framework
concerning the activity of the investor. But, as previously
explained, neither the existence of legitimate expectations nor the
mere fact that these have been violated suffices for establishing the
liability of the host state. Under the principle of the legitimate
expectations, such an infringement has-at the second step of the
test-to be balanced against the purpose pursued by the measure
in question.
According to the argument concerning the FET clause, the
application of proportionality will lead to the conclusion that the
infringement of the legitimate expectations of the investor is not
justified for measures aiming at the long-term promotion of human
rights.3 92 If a specific commitment was given by the host state to
the investor and the state measure in question is found to pursue a
long-term human rights objective, the expropriation will have to
be compensated in order to be legal. On the other hand, in
principle, the protective measures regarding an unforeseeable
situation will pass the balancing test, especially in cases where the
enactment of a human rights measure becomes necessary due to
the illegal conduct of the investor.39 3 Thus, the balancing process
that is inherent to the principle of legitimate expectations further
reduces the already narrowly defined situations where a state
measure enacted pursuant to human rights objectives will be found
to breach an investment agreement.3 94
Turning now to land property of an investor, the distinctinvestment-backed expectations principle does not apply. 395 As a
consequence, a human rights measure that fully deprives the
investor of her investment will be presumed to constitute an
unlawful expropriation if it is not compensated.3 96
It is suggested here that such a presumption could be rebutted
in most situations by assessing the expectations of the investor on
the basis of the principles applicable in investment law and
equated to the U.S. background principles of the State's law of
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025 (1992).
See Yannaca-Small, supra note 349, at 11.
394 See id.
395 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1066.
396 See id. at 1049; see Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-62 (1980).
392

393
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property and nuisance.39 7 Specifically, it is necessary to recall that,
according to the relevant U.S. case law, the function of these
background principles is not that of balancing the expropriatory
effect of the measure in question with its public and general
interest purpose. 398 These background principles intervene
upstream to deny the existence of a property right which,
consequently, cannot be affected by any type of measure.39 9
As Justice Scalia commented in Lucas, a background principle
cannot be based on law that is "newly legislated or decreed' "-it
must predate the entry into property. According to the view
expressed by the Supreme Court in Palazzolo, these background
principles are explained in terms of the common, shared
understandings of permissible limitations derived from a State's
legal tradition. 401' A regulation or common law rule cannot be a
background principle for some owners but not for others. The
determination of whether an existing, general law can limit all
economic use of property must turn on objective factors, such as
the nature of the land use proscribed.4 02
Hence, if one relies on U.S. caselaw, one concludes that a state
measure enacted to pursue a human rights objective cannot
constitute a background principle per se. However, it is contended
that the "national and international human rights law background"
does so. 403 Thus, relying on human rights law, the assessment of
whether the state measure in question has the power to legally
limit all economic use of investment without compensation should
mainly turn on one objective factor: the nuisance generated by the
investment.4 0
An investor cannot expect to cause nuisances affecting human
rights without triggering a reaction from the state. This is true

397 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.

See id. at 1018.
See generally id. (showing that a governmental land-use regulation that denies
the property owner any economically viable use is deemed a taking of the affected
property).
400 Id. at 1029.
401 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001).
402 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1013.
403 Id. at 1035.
404 See id
398
399
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whatever the responsibility of the investor in the nuisance may be.
Obviously this affects an investor who consciously causes such a
nuisance due to the illegal nature of her activity or the violation of
the rules regulating a lawful business.4 05 It also affects those
innocent investors whose investments turn out to be harmful.40 6
These innocent investors often invest in sensitive sectors of
scientific discoveries related to health and the environment.4 0 7
Thus, investors must be conscious of the fact that they operate in a
sector of activity whose regulation may be changed in order to
answer potential nuisances. 408 In these situations of a nuisance
caused by investments, a state measure enacted to protect human
rights that fully deprives an investor of her investment should not
be considered as violating the provision on indirect expropriation,
even if it is not compensated.4 09
It appears that whatever the nature of the property right, there
will be very few situations where a human rights state measure
will be considered an expropriation requiring compensation to be
legal.
Thus, in relation to the outcome of the analysis of the FET, one
can conclude that a state measure which pursues a human rights
objective will rarely be in breach of investment agreements.
Beyond the techniques of interpretation referred to in this section
(i.e., the legitimate expectation principle and the distinctinvestment-backed expectation principle), it is the aforementioned
schizophrenic ethos of the investment law regime that leaves space
and requires the balancing of investors and the public and general
See id. at 1031.
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1025.
407 See id. at 1053.
408 See id. at 1030. Furthermore, it has to be remembered that "risk" is part of the
definition of "investment."
409 See id. This conclusion would not be affected by the existence of a state specific
commitment not to modify the normative framework. As for the "guilty investor," if she
was granted with a license or a permit or she operates in a freezing normative framework
on the basis of a specific commitment, the legitimate expectations thus created are
obviously annihilated by their unlawful behaviour. They were indeed not granted with
the legitimate expectation to cause nuisance in relation to human rights. Regarding
innocent investors, it has been analyzed in relation with the FET provision, that the
application of the legitimate expectations principle led to the conclusion that a state
measure aiming to protect human rights in an unpredictable and emergency context will
pass the balancing test.
405

406
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interests.4 10

IV.

Conclusion

This article aimed at analyzing the situations where a nondiscriminatory state measure pursuing a human rights objective
may be found in breach of a host state's investment obligation in
the context of investment treaty arbitration.
This article argues that when facing this legal question, while
arbitrators are entitled to apply human rights norms, they are in no
way entitled to assess their violation, as their jurisdiction is only to
assess the breach of investment treaties. From this perspective,
specific jurisdictional limits affect the applicability of human
rights norms.
Beyond applicable law, this article contends that human rights
can come into play in the interpretation process, whether through
an external or an internal approach. Externally, human rights
norms can be taken into account by way of systemic integration.
As far as the internal approach is concerned, human rights
objectives form part of general and public interest, a concept that
is crucial in the framework of the investment law regime.
Being schizophrenic, this regime contains normative tools to
strike the balance between the interests of investor and human
rights objectives. First of all, treaty provisions do not grant
absolute rights to investors."1
Secondly, the investment law
regime contains guiding principles which strike this balance-the
legitimate
expectations
and
distinct-investment-backed
expectations principles.4 12 On the basis of their domestic law
origin, the operation of these principles was clarified and
elaborated on in the context of investment treaty arbitration.
Making use of this investment law tool-box, this article
demonstrates that a nondiscriminatory state measure pursuing a
human rights objective will rarely be viewed as violating the FET
*413
provision or as constituting indirect expropriation.
Through an analysis of the technical tools available to
arbitrators in the context of investment law disputes, this article
See Yannaca-Small, supra note 349, at 2-3.
See id.at 17.
412 Id.
413 See id.at 9.
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shows that even within the confines of the specific and limited
jurisdiction of arbitration tribunals, there is ample room for
consideration of human rights related issues. From a utilitarian
perspective, this article invites the promoters of human rights to
move beyond semantic activism focusing on the literal absence of
human rights in investment law treaties and underlying their
criticism of the regime as a whole. Rather, these promoters should
adopt a more constructive approach by looking within the regime
itself to see how its tools can be used to promote human rights,
regardless of the semantics used. Indeed, to reverse the famous
aphorism, not only must justice be seen to be done, but it must be
actually done to be seen.

